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PROLOGUE

In the year 1880, in Dalles City, Oregon, a large and valuable
load of lumber fell into the Columbia River and was about to be
carried away by the river's waters. Since Savage, the owner of this
lumber, was absent from the scene, Glenn - who, at that time, was
doing construction work for Savage - "furnished help and did ser
vice" in saving the lumber "from being washed away and lost."1
Seven years later, the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected Glenn's
claim that Savage owed him "the reasonable value" of his services
as well as of the services of the workmen he employed in saving the
lumber. The court did not deny that these services had been "meri
torious, and probably beneficial, to Savage," but it nonetheless in
sisted that the services "could not create a legal liability on the part
of Savage."2 "To make him liable," the Court ruled, "he must
either have requested the performance of the service, or, after he
knew of the service, he must have promised to pay for it." Other
wise, the law deems "an act done for the benefit of another, without
his request, as a voluntary act of courtesy, for which no action can
be sustained."3 Were it otherwise, the Court explained, the result
would be "ruinous litigation, and the overthrow of personal rights
and civil freedom."4 As the New Jersey Supreme Court had put it,
in an earlier case cited by the Glenn Court, were such actions per
mitted, "[n]o man's private business . . . would be under his control,
or free from the interference of strangers, perhaps idlers, drunk
ards, and perhaps enemies, under such pretences, drawing him from
business into litigation."5 Furthermore, if the law were otherwise, it
would do "violence to some of the kindest and best effusions of the
heart to suffer them afterwards to be perverted by sordid avarice."6
Hence, the law must not permit "meritorious and generous acts" to
be "afterwards converted into a pecuniary demand."7
1. Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 443 (Or. 1887).
2. 13 P. at 448.
3. 13 P. at 448.

P. at 448 (quoting Force v. Haines,
Force, 17 NJ.L. at 387.

4. 13
5.

6. 13 P. at 448.
7. 13 P. at 448.

17

N.J.L.

385, 387 (1840)).
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Although some of the details of the doctrine governing such in
stances of good samaritan intervention have changed since the sem
inal case of

Glenn v. Savage,

there has been no change in the basic

approach of the common law with regard to good samaritans who
render help and services in response to another's need without any
preexisting duty (private or public) to intervene. This approach is
especially persistent in cases like

Glenn v. Savage where unsolicited

benefits are conferred in order to preserve or protect another per
son's property or financial concerns (as distinguished from her life
or health).8 It is best evidenced in the wide range of epithets di
rected at good samaritans when they seek restitution for the ex
penses they incurred or for the value of the services they supplied.
In most cases, good samaritans are described by the courts as
"mere" strangers, volunteers, officious meddlers, intermeddlers, or
interlopers.9 Needless to say, use of these derogatory epithets usu
ally indicates that the plaintiff's claim is doomed to fail.1°
In this article, I contest this "long standing judicial reluctance to
encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of another by
awarding restitution of benefits thereby conferred."11 In particular,
I take a critical look at the two rationales suggested in Glenn for
this reluctance: the concern for preserving personal liberty and the
claim that altruism should be reward enough in itself. I contend
that both rationales are misconceived, and that a reasonable ac
count of both liberty and altruism requires that we relinquish the
traditional reluctance that typifies the law's treatment of good sa
maritan claims. To be sure, I do not maintain that these two very
different considerations lead to the same conclusions regarding the
precise contours of an alternative doctrine. On the contrary, one
theme of this article is that delineating the precise doctrinal details
requires significant normative choices. Nonetheless, it should be
8. See 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsrmrnoN § 10.3 (1978 & Supp. 1998);
G.H.L. FRIDMAN, REsrmrnoN 271, 276-78 (2d ed. 1992); KEITH MAsoN & J.W. CARTER,
REsrmrnON LAW IN AUSTRALIA 254 (1995).
9.

See John

W. Wade,

Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request,

19 VAND. L.

REv. 1183, 1184 (1966).
10. See REsrATEMENT OF REsTITUTioN § 2 (1937) ("A person who officiously confers a
benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor."); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
REsrmrnoN § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) (similar rule). In most cases where recovery
has been allowed for services rendered to others motivated by altruism, there has been a
strong and direct public interest in the performance of that service, such as where a close
relative of a deceased has paid funeral expenses and seeks reimbursement from the estate.
See, e.g., REsrATEMENT OF REsrmrnoN § 115 cmt. b (1937); JoHN P. DAWSON & GEORGE
E. PALMER, CASES ON REsrmrnoN 48 (2d ed. 1969). This article focuses on cases in which
no such direct public interest exists.
11. PALMER,

supra note

8, at 359.
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emphasized that neither liberty nor altruism can vindicate either
the traditional hostility toward unsolicited benefactors or the result
in

Glenn v. Savage.
Indeed, my claim is that

both liberty and

altruism can justify, in

certain circumstances, acknowledging good samaritan claims for re
imbursement of expenses incurred as well as for compensation for
services rendered or for certain damages suffered by the benefactor
as a consequence of her act. My analysis perceives these remedies
as instruments for encouraging beneficial interventions or, more
precisely, for offsetting countervailing incentives faced by potential
good samaritans. I maintain that personal liberty justifies - or
even mandates - such an offsetting whenever it is evident (at the
time when the potential benefactor must decide whether or not to
act) that the beneficiary's expected gain from intervention exceeds
the expected costs of the intervention, provided that there is no rea
sonable way for the beneficiary to communicate actual consent. I
further contend that there is one conception of altruism that can
justify a similar rule and that other conceptions could be even more
amenable to good samaritans' claims.
The doctrine of good samaritan intervention obviously is not the
most frequently applied segment of private law. Therefore, the di
rect practical significance of an argument against the traditional
doctrine may be rather marginal. Yet claims of good samaritans
have always captured the interest of private law scholars.12 I be
lieve that this interest is not only due to the intricacies of this doc
trine (some of which are explored in Part III), but rather, is also
entailed by a sense - which I hope to help vindicate in the discus
sion that follows - that the social significance of the legal prescrip
tion for these cases cannot be reduced to its direct behavioral
impact. This apparently inconsequential doctrine may, upon reflec
tion, turn out to be a rather significant segment of our law - and
thus, indirectly, of the kind of society in which we live - due to the

12.

See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler (pt. 1), 74

HARv. L. R:Ev. 817 (1961) [hereinafter Dawson, (pt. 1)]; John P. Dawson, Negotiorum Ges
tio: The Altruistic Intermeddler (pt. 2), 74 HARv. L. R:Ev. 1073 (1961) [hereinafter Dawson,
(pt. 2)]; Edward W. Hope, Officiousness (pt. 1), 15 CoRNELL L.Q. 25 (1929); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Saul Levmore, Waiting

for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative
Obligations, 72 VA. L. R:Ev. 879 (1986); Mitchell Mcinnes, Restitution and the Rescue of Life,
32 ALBERTA L. R:Ev. 37 (1994); F.D. Rose, Restitution for the Rescuer, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 167 (1989); Robert A. Long, Jr., Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 YALE
LJ. 415 (1984).
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symbolic and expressive ramifications of the social choices it
embodies.13
II.
A.

ENCOURAGING Goon SAMARITANISM

Restitution as an Instrument for Encouraging
Potential Benefactors

In this Part, I seek to defend the claim that common law should
change its basic approach to good samaritans and adopt, in its
stead, a far more favorable attitude, the details of which are devel
oped in Part III. As a prelude to the main arguments in favor of
this conclusion, I need to clarify two presuppositions and one limi
tation to the analysis that follows. The title of this section is in
tended

to

capture

the

essence

of

these

caveats,

but

each

nonetheless requires a brief elaboration.
Restitution

-

I suggest in the title - can serve as an instrument

for encouraging potential benefactors to render necessary assist
ance. Hence, I highlight the incentive effect of the applicable legal
rules.14 More particularly, I imply two presuppositions. First, I as
sume that the pertinent doctrine has some (at least marginal) im
pact on the behavior of potential benefactors; or more precisely, I
presume that the hostility demonstrated by the traditional doctrine
toward claims made by good samaritans for restitution of the costs
incurred due to their intervention could discourage potential bene
factors from intervening.15 Second, I assume that the content of the
relevant legal rules is to be decided from a prospective viewpoint,
rather than from a retrospective perspective (or, at least, not pri
marily on the basis of retrospective considerations).16 Hence, the
discussion that follows omits any reference to the backward-looking
concept of corrective justice that is, at times, said to be the underly13. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Thro11gh Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2055, 2057-58 (1996) (exploring the expressive dimension of law); Richard H. Pildes,
The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 938 (1991)
(same).
14. For a similar approach, see ANDREW BuRRows, THE LAW OF REsrrruTioN 243-44,
246 (1993); Garry A. Muir, Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener, in EssAYS ON REsn
TUTION 297, 308-09, 314-15 (Paul D. Fmn ed., 1990).
15. See Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 44-45; Rose, supra note 12, at 178. For a much more
skeptical view regarding the ability of law to affect human behavior, see lzHAK ENoLARD,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 43-44 (1993).
16. For a similar assumption, see GARETH JoNES, REsrrrunoN IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
LAw 144 (1991). This assumption corresponds with the generally accepted view that one
important function of law is to direct behavior. See JosEPH RAz, The F11nctions of Law, in
THE AUTHORITY OF LAw: EssAYS ON LAw AND MORALITY 169 (1979).
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ing foundation of restitutionary doctrines.17 Likewise, I will not
consider the possibility of perceiving certain restitutionary duties
imposed on beneficiaries of good samaritan interventions as a way
of institutionalizing a (backward-looking) moral debt of gratitude
on their part.18
A prospective approach interested in affecting the behavior of
potential benefactors can lead down several different paths, but this
article is limited to one. One possible path, which I do not discuss
in this article, is the imposition of positive duties to rescue and as
sist backed by criminal or civil sanctions. The legal and philosophi
cal questions raised by this path, then, need not be considered
herein.19 By the same token, I will not consider, except in passing,
the maritime doctrine of salvage, which allows rescuers a positive
reward for their (successful) efforts.20 The considerations raised in
the maritime context are unique - most notably, the need to pro
mote a salvage industry, due mainly to the unique equipment and
skills that are required for successful interventions - and are,
therefore, beyond the scope of this article.
Hence, I will focus exclusively on only one type of legal norm,
namely, those rules that entitle benefactors to restitution of the
costs they have incurred due to and while performing their well
intended services. These rules seem to be intended to offset "pre
legal" countervailing disincentives for potential good samaritans; to
"neutralize" any worry they may have ex ante that their other
regarding intervention ultimately will cause them actual loss, such
as uncompensated expenses or damages (the terms "encourage"
and "encouragement" are employed below as shorthand for this
more precise meaning).21 In advocating expansion of these rules,
17. See Kit Barker, Unjust Enrichment: Containing the Beast, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 457, 468-74 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 1999). I have expressed some skepticism
elsewhere with regard to the explanatory power, as well as the normative value, of the con
cept of corrective justice for restitutionary theory. See liANoCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICH
MENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PuBuc VALUES 31-32 (1997).
18. See generally A. JoHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
163-183 (1979) (discussing the moral debt of gratitude).
19.

cue, in

AND

PoLmCAL OBLIGATIONS

See generally Michael A. Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Res
THE DUIY TO REsCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 5 (Michael A. Menlowe &

Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993).
20. For a review of the pertinent doctrine, see Ross A. Albert, Co=ent,
CALL. REv. 85, 111-15 (1986).

Restitutionary

Recovery for Rescuers ofHuman Life, 14

21. Saul Levmore suggests that "it is convenient to think of a legal right to reimburse
ment as a reward," because whereas reimbursement in itself merely "erases a penalty other
wise incurred by a rescuer," a legal entitlement to reimbursement of expenses creates "a
package of reimbursement, public acclaim, and private gratitude," which, as a whole, may be
regarded by potential rescuers as "a substantial carrot." Levmore, supra note 12, at 882. In
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this Part confronts a fundamental question: Why should the law
discard its traditional reluctant stance - which merely maintains
the "pre-legal" state of affairs in which claims of potential benefac
tors are not guaranteed - and adopt, in its stead, a doctrine that
encourages good samaritan intervention?
The following sections suggest two answers to this question.
The first answer acts to justify encouragement of good samaritan
ism by referring to the (hypothetical) will of the beneficiary. The
second answer finds its premise in the inherent value of altruism,
and its justification for encouraging good samaritanism is concern
for others, which is nurtured and inculcated by beneficial interven
tions. As we shall see, the relationship between the personal liberty
account and the altruistic account is not a simple one. These two
approaches raise different considerations that may justify

v. Savage notwithstanding - encouraging

-

Glenn

good samaritanism. The

latter approach, which is grounded in altruism, however, is open to
several different interpretations, yielding correspondingly divergent
policies. While one version of this approach serves to reinforce the
conclusions of the personal liberty account, others engender certain
variations of this account, some of which are rather radical. This
complexity should be borne in mind when we arrive at Part III of
this article, where I outline an alternative doctrine of good samari
tan intervention.
B.

Personal Liberty and the Encouragement of
Beneficial Interventions

A tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Restitution
explains,
The chief policy [of the doctrine that denies restitution for benefits
officiously conferred] can be expressed in two ways. First, a person
should have the privilege of determining for [her]self what obligations
[she] wishes to assume; and second, no one should be empowered to
thrust a benefit on another and by that means become [her] creditor.

contrast to these incentives, which Levmore suggests may turn reimbursement into a positive
reward, there are countervailing factors that reduce the likelihood of the promised reim·
bursement's being awarded or being fully compensatory if awarded (for example, the possi
bility that the ex post judicial determination will not perceive the intervention as reasonable,
the litigation costs involved, the possible difficulties in collecting the reimbursement, or the
possibility of the beneficiary's insolvency). It is difficult to decide how to balance all of the
additional considerations mentioned in this footnote. Therefore - and for the sake of keep
ing the analysis simple - I assume that they are more or less of equal force, thus ignoring
them altogether.
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The ideal is that of self-determination, or autonomy, in incurring
obligations.22

But does this ideal - which, for the purposes of this section, is
assumed to be an uncontroversial good - in actual fact justify the
rather extreme anti-interventionist rules currently prevalent in most
Anglo-American jurisdictions? I believe that it does not. In order
to understand why, we must first consider the familiar account of
requiring restitution for unsolicited benefits in the name of a "hypo
thetical contract."23

1.

The Hypothetical Contract Theory

The prescription advocated by hypothetical contract theorists is
simple and powerful: courts, they claim, should allow recovery to
unsolicited interveners - that is, should allow them to impose a
hypothetical contract on their beneficiaries - if, and only if, the
court can reasonably conclude that at the point in time that the ben
efit was conferred, the beneficiary would have agreed to pay for it
had she been able to communicate her express wishes. Thus, this
requirement implies that recovery is justified only if two conditions
are met: (a) prohibitive transaction costs - usually due to the un
availability of the beneficiary or the need of an immediate interven
tion - preclude the possibility of negotiating an express agreement
before conferring the benefit; and (b) the imposed transaction

mimics the assumed (ex ante) intentions of the beneficiary - that
is, the transaction is to her advantage (when its expected benefits
are compared with its expected costs).24
22. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsrrnmoN § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
For similar propositions, see Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 248 (Eng.
C.A. 1886); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-REsrrnmON 376, 470
(2d ed. 1993); GEORGE B. KLIPPE RT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 99-100 (1983); MAsoN &
CARTER, supra note 8, at 237, 241; SJ. STOLJAR, THE LAW OF QUASI-C ONTRACT 185-86 (2d
ed. 1989); Lee J. Aileen, Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law: A Jurisdictional Ap
proach, 11 SYD NEY L. REv. 566, 598 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 200-01 (1992); John
D. McCamus, Necessitous Intervention: The Altruistic Intermeddler and the Law of Restitu
tion, 11 OTTAWA L. REv. 297, 300-01 (1979).
23. The idea of a hypothetical contract should not be confused with the arcane and infa
mous legal fiction that conceptualized the entirety of the law of restitution in terms of
"quasi" contract or contract "implied-in-law." See JE ROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MrND 42 (1970) (criticizing the concept of contract implied-in-law); Christopher T. Wonnell,
Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 212-14 (1996)
(same).
24. See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.13, at 151-52 (5th ed.
1998); Long, supra note 12, at 420-24. The seeds of a doctrine based on these conditions can
be found within the traditional rules which allow, in similar circumstances, claims ."to restitu
tion for services rendered or expenditures incurred" in preserving another's things or credit,
but only if the claimant "was in lawful possession or custody of the things or if [s]he lawfully

Michigan Law Review

1160

[Vol. 97:1152

Hypothetical contract theorists are divided, however, with re
spect to such idiosyncratic preferences as the preference to benefit
from one's own efforts rather than from the unsolicited efforts of
others.

On the one hand, it has been claimed that the "court

imposed transaction [must make] the involuntary parties subjec
tively better off, not merely . . . [increase] their wealth."25 There
fore, any subjective objection, even if based on idiosyncratic or
accidental characteristics of the defendants should be "a fatal re
sponse to a proposed hypothetical agreement. "26

On the other

hand, proponents of a more expansive doctrine have maintained
that the courts should not allow such evidence of idiosyncratic pref
erences or accidental characteristics of the beneficiary and should
adhere instead to an "idealized contract of the kind that rational
and informed parties would have perceived as mutually beneficial
had they had that opportunity."27
These views are obviously at odds in terms of their doctrinal
implications, but they share an underlying assumption. The restric
tive approach insists that the hypothetical contract story be prem
ised upon the value of individual

liberty

and suggests that

abandoning the subjective utility calculus in favor of an objective
standard of cost-benefit analysis violates this value. The expansive
approach unabashedly admits that a hypothetical contract imposed
where the twofold requirement doctrine is met cannot be supported
by values of personal autonomy. Rather, such hypothetical con
tracts are justified only by efficiency considerations: they are in
tended to "reward the bestowers of positive externalities" and to
encourage "value-creating activities" in cases where "market alter
natives" are unavailable.28 Thus, both approaches presuppose that
individual liberty cannot justify the relatively broad doctrine that
finds the satisfaction of the two conditions listed above sufficient to
support liability.
I wish to challenge this assumption and, in so doing, claim that
personal liberty - and not only efficiency - justifies a doctrine
that admits good samaritan claims for restitution whenever the
took possession thereof," i.e., where she finds herself in the position of an involuntary bailee.
REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 117 (1937).

25. Long,
26.

supra

note 12, at 424.

Id.

27. Wonnell, supra note 23, at 214; cf. Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Jus
tice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 490, 492 (1979).

28. See Wonnell, supra note 23,

at 216-17.
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above two (objective) conditions are met.29 Substantiating this
claim requires, first, some elaboration of the Second Restatement's
ideal of self-determination, or autonomy, in incurring obligations.
It also requires exploring the (weak) sense in which the court
imposed contract is hypothetical in cases of good samaritan inter
vention where the two conditions of the hypothetical contract the
ory are fulfilled. Finally, it requires explaining why such
hypothetical contracts - as opposed to contracts that are hypothet
ical in a stronger sense - can coexist with (and are maybe even
required by) the ideal of personal liberty.
2.

The Restatement's Ideal

The Second Restatement's ideal of self-determination, or auton
omy, in incurring obligations30 echoes the familiar liberal value
(some may prefer to call it ideology) of negative liberty. It is prem
ised on the belief that independence ("freedom from") -although
it is not necessarily the ultimate value - is essential to personal
development and autonomy.31 Because each individual is distinct
and unique, each should be able to choose her goals voluntarily (as
well as the means of achieving such goals) and should be held re
sponsible for such choices.32 People should enjoy-that is, the law
should guarantee them - a private moral sphere that is free from
forcible human interference. Boundary crossing, trespassing on the
individual's moral space, should be viewed with suspicion and, pref
erably, deterred. Individuals should, therefore, be entitled to con
trol of their resources, at least insofar as they do not actively harm
others in exercising such control. Their actual consent-express or
implied, but, in all events, actual and not legally imposed-should
29. The discussion that follows can be read as an extension of Randy Barnett's claim that
a consent theory of contract can coexist with (and even justify) the objective approach to
contract interpretation. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L.
REv. 269, 300-07 (1986).
30. One may assume that this ideal does not restrict the legitimacy of imposing a duty not
to harm others.
31. See lsAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FoUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122,
124 (1969). But see generally CHAR.LEs TAYLOR, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in
PHILOSOPHY AND nm HUMAN SqENCES (PHILosoPHICAL PAPERS 2) 211 (1985) (challenging
the coherence of the notion-0F-ne ative liberty).

g

See Charles Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAw: SELECTED
TANNER LECTURES ON MoRAL PHILosoPHY 89, 94-95 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1987).
32.

Charles Taylor calls the vision of the human condition underlying the Restatement's ideal
"atomism." See CHAR.LES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILosoPHY AND nm HUMAN SCIENCES
(PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2) 187, 187-88 (1985).
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be the prerequisite to any legitimate transfer of, or interference
with, any of their resources.33
This normative infrastructure explains the instinctive caution
with which common law treats good samaritans34 (although I insist
below that this infrastructure does not justify the extent of its hostil
ity toward their claims). Instances of unsolicited benefits threaten
potential beneficiaries' control over their resources. Hence, a legal
regime that takes seriously people's negative liberty must adopt the
potential beneficiary's point of view. It must, as a rule, require that
these potential beneficiaries be the gatekeepers of their own affairs.
Thus, a contract is the proper and only legitimate way of effectuat
ing any external interference, especially where, in the final analysis,
it is performed at the expense of the beneficiary of the interference.
A person's actual - and not idealized - consent, her unencum

bered free will, should be the sole judge of the desirability of any
external interference in her affairs.
3.

Strong and Weak Hypothetical Contracts

The previous paragraphs explain why claims of idealized or hy
pothetical contracts, which are currently in vogue in normative dis
course, are frequently problematic from the standpoint of personal
liberty. Thus, for example, there has been some resistance - which
I find convincing - to using a hypothetical contract as justification
for the normative desirability of wealth maximization. Critics claim
that the consent that is attributed to individuals in order to accord a
contractarian validation to the maxim of wealth maximization is not
only hypothetical, it is often counterfactual - that is, attributed to
individuals in circumstances where it is rather obvious that had they
been asked for their opinion, they would not have given the consent
attributed to them and may have even expressed objection.35 One
important reason for this conclusion is that, due to the marginal
utility of money, wealth maximization systematically improves the
33. See, e.g., STEVEN LUKES, INDIVIDUALISM 66 (1973); ROBERT Noz1cK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 57, 71-73 (1974); F.A. Hayek, Freedom and Coercion, in LIBERTY 80, 8182, 89, 95-98 (David Miller ed., 1991).
34. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 139; P.B.H. Birks, Negotiorum Gestio and the Common
Law, 24 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS . 110, 112 (1971); Wendy J. Gordon, OfHarms and Benefits:
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 463-64 (1992); Hope,
supra note 12, at 29, 31.
35. See JuLES L. COLEMAN, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, in MARKETS,
MoRALS AND THE LAW 95, 127-29 (1988); RONALD DWORKIN, Why Efficiency?, in A MAT
TER OF PRINCIPLE 267, 275-80 (1985).
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condition of the better-off, but may well also systematically hurt the
worse-off.36
But note the difference in the hypothetical contract discussed in
this section, as opposed to the hypothetical contract which is said to
justify the maxim of wealth maximization.37 Unlike the hypotheti
cal contract advanced by proponents of wealth maximization, ours
is not evidently counterfactual;38 in other words, it is not a contract
that systematically leads to one party finding itself on the losing
side. To be sure, the hypothetical contract discussed here has never
been agreed to, explicitly or implicitly, by the parties involved. It is,
nonetheless, idealized in only a weak sense. It is supported by the
outward behavior of the benefactor and - much more significantly
- by reasonable assumptions regarding the consent of the benefici
ary: the hypothetical contract must be, from the beneficiary's (ex
ante) point of view, cost-beneficial and enforced only because pro
hibitive transaction costs prevented actual negotiation. Further
more, an implicit, third condition under the hypothetical contract
theory needs to be addressed explicitly in order to explain the weak
sense of idealization it requires. According to this condition, any
external indication, explicit or implicit, of the beneficiary's objec
tion (idiosyncratic as it may be) to the beneficial interference that
the benefactor should have reasonably noticed before conferring
the benefit necessarily mandates the rejection of a claim of a hypo
thetical contract and, thus, denial of the good samaritan claim. Any
actual or implied voice of the beneficiary that indicates that she
may disapprove of the intervention must be fatal to this claim if we
are to remain loyal to personal liberty.
Indeed, unlike stronger forms of hypothetical contracts, ours is a
modest technique that is intended to assess, in circumstances where
there is no better method, what the best course of action would be
from the perspective of the potential beneficiary herself. The last
stage of my argument in this section is to claim that this weak form
of a hypothetical contract does not violate the conception of per
sonal liberty discussed above and, indeed, may even be required by

36. See Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 227, 240 (1980).
37. The discussion that follows can be read as criticism of the indiscriminate nature of
some of the critiques of contractarian arguments in law, such as Jules L. Coleman et al., A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12
HARV. J L. & PuB. POLY. 639, 645-46 (1989).
38. Cf. PETER BIRKS, AN INrn.ooucnoN TO THE LAW OF REsmunoN 195 (1985).
.
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The ramifications of successfully substantiating this claim

would be that personal liberty, and not only efficiency, necessarily
supports the expansive approach to the hypothetical contract
theory.40
4.

Weak Hypothetical Contracts and Personal Liberty

Consider the choice faced by the court in a case of good samari
tan intervention: it can either afford relief or refrain from doing so.

If it declines, it acts to deter

(for most - rational and not particu

larly other-regarding-potential benefactors) interferences, which
are, from the ex ante perspective of the beneficiary, cost-benefi
cial.41 The reason for this disincentive is straightforward: because
negotiation is impractical, a potential benefactor would fear that
the beneficiary -whom she does not know and can only presume
to be as rational and not particularly other-regarding as she is would refuse ex post to reimburse her for her expenses, from which
the beneficiary has already benefitted. Put differently, without a
legal guarantee, a potential benefactor - who needs to decide
whether to intervene before she is able to receive the beneficiary's
binding commitment that she will, indeed, reimburse her - must
take into account that her well-intended intervention could be
abused. This would, at least at the margin, deter beneficial inter
ventions. In most cases, where the potential beneficiary is rational,
this result would frustrate, rather than enhance, her preferences.
I, for one, would be hard-pressed to find a reason for how the
law, in the name of personal liberty, could lead to such a disap
pointing outcome. Once the third (no observable objection) and
first (prohibitive transaction costs) conditions of the hypothetical
contract theory are fulfilled, the defendant cannot be said to be de
prived of any meaningful choice.42 The choice to encourage or dis
courage interventions that are objectively beneficial (as assured by
the second condition of this weak hypothetical contract theory)
must be made, in any event, by the law. Is it reasonable for the law
39. A similar justification for resorting to "weak hypothetical contracts" emerges from
Ronald Dworkin's argument against interpreting Rawls's original position as an argument of
a "strong hypothetical contract." See RONALD DwoRKIN, Justice and Rights, in TAKING
R.lGIITS SERIOUSLY 152 (1977).
40. The expansive approach to the hypothetical contract theory maintains that good sa
maritan claims should not be denied due to idiosyncratic preferences that the good samaritan
could not have observed prior to her intervention. See supra text accompanying note 27.
41. See Donald Wittman, Good Samaritan Rule, in 2 THE NE W PALSORAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND TiiE LAW 202 {1998).
42. See DoBBS, supra note 22, at 485.
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to undermine the preferences of the majority of (rational) benefi
ciaries (by discouraging beneficial interferences) in the name of
preventing any boundary crossing when we ·cannot be absolutely
certain that the beneficiary would have voluntarily consented? Is it
reasonable to do so even in circumstances where beneficiaries have
no way of communicating their (frequent) approval or (in the rare
cases of idiosyncratic beneficiaries) disapproval?
These questions must be answered in the negative.43 While wa
riness of boundary crossings - the commitment to negative free
dom - is of immense importance for personal liberty, it is not, as
may be recalled, its ultimate prescription (at least not in the liberal
tradition).44 Rather, negative freedom serves a more fundamental
purpose:

personal development and autonomy, in other words,

self-determination. In many cases, promoting the means (negative
freedom) does not clash with achieving the end (self-determina
tion). In some cases, however, promoting the means does threaten
to undermine the end. In such cases the legal norms that best pro
mote negative freedom must retreat and give way to those norms
that best promote the individual's more essential interest to act on
her goals and aspirations.
Cases of good samaritan intervention in which all three condi
tions of the hypothetical contract theory are met clearly belong to
this category. Where it is impractical to inquire whether the benefi
ciary approves of the intervention and there are no external indica
tions that she disapproves of the court-imposed contract of
intervention in consideration of restitution of expenses, a court
would be justified in allowing claims on the basis of a hypothetical
contract, provided that the intervention is (ex ante) cost-benefi
cial.45 As we have seen, rejecting such claims would have the effect
of discouraging potential good samaritans. This undoubtedly would
promote the means of deterring boundary crossings, thereby pre
serving the individual's moral space from any interference by an43. The argument that follows is not intended, obviously, to exhaust the familiar debate
respecting negative vs. positive liberty, since many of its aspects - e.g., the meaningfulness
of choice without adequate means or the legitimacy of interfering with people's explicit
choices which seem "objectively" to their detriment - are irrelevant here. My only concern
is to highlight the difficulties of a position that insists on preventing boundary crossings
where all three conditions of the weak hypothetical contract account apply.
44. See H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHI
LOSOPHY 198, 206-07 (1983); WILL KYMLICKA, CoNTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 120,
123-25 (1990).
45. Courts nonetheless may be concerned that their ex post evaluation of the benefactor's

ex ante estimation of the expected efficiency of her intervention may be prone to error, and,
therefore, they may increase somewhat the margin of error to ensure that the contract they
are imposing indeed corresponds to the beneficiary's ex ante interests.

Michigan Law Review

1166

(Vol. 97:1152

other and serving, in the best possible way, the interests of certain
idiosyncratic beneficiaries. In most cases, however, discouraging
good samaritanism would be at the cost of frustrating the end that
we initially ascribed to such a policy, namely, ensuring that an indi
vidual's preferences determine the fate of everything that is within
her moral space.46
C.

Varieties of Altruism and the Alleged Paradox of
Encouraging Altruism

Having discussed the first, liberty-based argument advanced in

Glenn v. Savage,

I wish to tum now to the second argument raised

against claims of good samaritans. "The law will never permit," de
clared the

Glenn court,

"a friendly act, or such as was intended to

be an act of kindness or benevolence, to be afterwards converted
into a pecuniary demand." The reason for this is that it "would be
doing violence to some of the kindest and best effusions of the
heart to suffer them afterwards to be perverted by sordid ava
rice. "47 In other words - those of an English court almost a cen
tury earlier - "perhaps it is better for the public that these
voluntary acts of benevolence from one man to another, which are
charities and moral duties, but not legal duties, should depend alto
gether for their reward upon the moral duty of gratitude."48
Should, indeed, altruism be its own reward?49

By allowing

claims of good samaritans, do courts in fact obliterate altruism? In
what follows, I answer these questions in the negative. I maintain
that, contrary to the spirit of these judicial statements (and to some
academic elaborations thereupon),50 a genuine commitment to fos
tering altruism requires a favorable legal response in cases of altru
istic intervention. I begin by offering a summary account of the
value of altruism and by characterizing such a favorable doctrine as
46. Can this conclusion be too harsh on beneficiaries for whom the intervention is not
value-increasing due to their relative poverty (which makes the effective cost of payment
higher for them than for the typical beneficiary)? Will such beneficiaries be forced into desti
tution? This result may indeed eventuate in cases of bodily injuries sustained by good samar
itans, hence the plausibility of socializing this type of cost, discussed infra text accompanying
notes 179-81. In other types of cases, however, they are much less likely to occur, because in
most interventions the benefactor would know (or, in any event, should have known) - as
we usually do utilizing normal social cues - the approximate status of the intended benefici
ary and should thus take it into account. Hence, it is only respecting "real eccentricities" that
my discussion concludes that subjective preferences should not be counted.
47. Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887).
48. Nicholson v. Chapman, 126 Eng. Rep. 536, 539 (1793).
49. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) oF REsrrruo
u N § 3 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1983); McCamus, supra note 22, at 302.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.

Good Samaritan

March 1999]

1167

a form of "institutionalized limited altruism." Only with this as my
background can I consider the abovementioned challenges and try
to explain why I find them to be misconceived. Having cleared the
way for an altruism-based argument for good samaritan claims, this
section will conclude by considering some of the complexities of
such an argument: pointing to certain varieties of altruism and to
the entailing divergent doctrinal implications.

1.

Restitution as Institutionalized Limited Altruism

Philosophers have invested considerable thought to the impor
tance we attach to altruism, but this is not the appropriate place for
a detailed account. It will suffice to mention two approaches.51
One view contends that altruism arises from the human capacity to
view oneself simultaneously from both the personal and the imper
sonal standpoints. This capacity is premised on "a recognition of
the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to re
gard oneself as merely one individual among many," all of whom
are included in a common world and are persons in as full a sense as
oneself is.52

Another view explains altruism in communitarian

terms. This account emphasizes the human need for social solidar
ity, communal concern, and a sense of togetherness, all of which can
be satisfied only in a moral community that is premised on a maxim
of mutual responsibility - hence, our natural tendency to under
stand any other-regarding requirement as a way of contributing to a
community we regard as our own.53 These accounts differ in many
respects. Nonetheless, they converge in finding that the justifica
tion for responding to others' claims is the importance we attach (or
should attach) to others, whether as atomized human beings or as
fellow members of our constitutive community - whether due to
rational deliberation or to innate emotions. In short, the appeal of
51. A third explanation of altruism is based on empathy, or identification with others and
the incorporation of their interests into our subjective welfare function. See Jane J.
Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall ofSelfInterest in the Explanation of Political Life, in BEYOND
SELF-INTEREST 3, 20 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST,
supra at 25, 31-34. But surely the benevolent sentiments people actually have are directed at
a much narrower circle than the entire range of beneficiaries of the legal rules discussed
herein (i.e., the whole legal community - typically the state). See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE
NEEDS OF STRANGERS (1984). Hence, the empathy factor will not be considered here.
52. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE PossIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3, 19, 82, 88, 100, 144 (1970).
53. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LoYALTY: AN EssAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATION
SHIPS 18 (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 143 (1982);
Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us - Not Me, or My Conscience, in
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at 97, 99; David Miller, Distributive Justice: What the
People Think, 102 ETHICS 555, 560-62, 570-72 (1992).
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other-regarding ideas derives from the other-regarding element of
the self.
I suggest that we analyze a doctrine that takes a favorable view
of good samaritan interventions as a form of institutionalized lim
ited altruism:s4 a legal device that calls for other-regarding action
and seeks to inculcate other-regarding motives; an institutional de
sign that responds to and supports the other-regarding perspective
of human beings.ss Thus, such a doctrine regards us as "divided
selves": individuals who have both a personal perspective - preoc
cupied with self-interest - and an impersonal or communitarian
perspective (depending on one's preferred theory of altruism),
which is the source of other-regarding action.s6 This doctrine ap
peals to the other-regarding standpoint of the agent. It seeks to
sustain and inculcate her other-regarding side or, at least, to create
"an ecological niche" for altruistic behavior and altruistic motives.s7
The metaphor of a divided self helps explain the limited altru
ism that this proposed doctrine seeks to institutionalize. A restitu
tionary doctrine that favors good samaritan claims does not require
actual self-sacrifice; instead, it guarantees potential good samaritans
reimbursement of any expenses they incur.

It thus encourages

them to be aware of another's distress, expecting them to inconven
ience themselves to some extent in response to such distress. It en
courages them, more precisely, to be prepared to set aside pursuit
of their nonwelfare interests for the benefit of others, knowing that

54. Altruism is one of the most prominent explications given by civil law scholars for the
doctrine of Negotiorum Gestio, which deals with good samaritan interventions. See ALAIN A.
LAVASSEUR, LoUISIANA LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND QUASI-CONTRACTS 68-69
(1951); LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, THE BYSTANDER: BEHAVIOR, LAW, ETHICS 131 (1978);
Samuel J. Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, in 10 INTL. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch.
17, at 13 (1984); Cheryl L. Martin, Co=ent, Louisiana State Law Institute Proposes Revi
sion of Negotiorum Gestio and Codification of Unjust Enrichment, 69 TuL. L. REv. 181, 212
(1994).
55. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 52, at 79. I believe that expanding the notion of self-interest to
incorporate other-regarding motives only makes it vacuous, because we are still left with the
problem of distinguishing action that is totally indifferent to the ultimate welfare of others
from action that is, at least partially, concerned with the welfare of others. In contrast, in
separating the notions of "self-interest" (narrowly perceived) and "altruism," we maintain
and, thus, are able to examine this important distinction. See AMrrAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL
DIMENSION: TowARD A NEW EcoNoMics 34-35 (1988); Christopher Jencks, Varieties ofAl
truism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at 53, 55.
56. See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10-32 (1991); BRIAN BARRY, THE
ORIES OF JUSTICE 283-85, 357-66 (1989); ETZIONI, supra note 55, at 63, 85, 253-54; Jane J.
Mansbridge, Preface to BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at ix, xiii.
57. See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 18, 20; Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation ofAltruism
and SelfInterest, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 51, at 133.
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any actual sacrifice they may make in their intervention is only tem
porary, that is, relatively easily reversed.SS
Indeed, the altruism institutionalized herein is by no means of a
heroic or purely selfless nature; it does not expect unreserved sub
ordination of an agent's self-interest. On the contrary, it is a some
what calculated altruism, a willingness to benefit the other, but at
the other's own expense.59 Nevertheless, requiring people to serve
the interests of others in circumstances where the former have no
self-interest in so doing (such as the possibility of reaping some
profit or reward)60 is virtuous enough. Such delineation of the ex
pected balance between self and other is a sensible limitation of the
level of altruism (the "call of duty") prescribed by a doctrine that
acknowledges that our self is divided; that an individual's primary
attachment is to her personal interests, projects, and commitments;
and that institutionalized altruism can insist only that such attach
ment be restrained by the other-regarding standpoint.61 After all,
moral individuals are not - and should not be expected to be moral saints; they do not - and should not be expected to - set
aside their needs; "they include themselves in the calculation and
give themselves weight in the determination of the right action to
make."62

2. Altruism and Law
Consider now the difficulty with which this section began. At
least as it is conventionally perceived, altruism is a virtue, "a self
perfective quality." It focuses on the agent's nature and defines
moral goodness in terms of "the excellence of the agent's charac58. See John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL & Ptra. AFF. 382, 385 (1976); cf. Ernest
Weinrib, Rescue and Restitution, 1 S'vARA: J. PHIL & JUDAISM 59, 64-65 (1990).
59. See Stoljar, supra note 54, at 14, 24, 149.
60. For a more detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 155-59.
61. See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 37-38. Tue difficulty with setting limits on the degree of
altruism expected from "a divided self' is aggravated when one considers, as we do here,
altruism in the context of the large scale nation-state (or, even more obviously, the world
community), rather than in the context of any smaller sub-unit thereof. When large numbers
of potential beneficiaries are involved - as in the case of practically every legal community
- small contributions add up to "heroic totals" that most would perceive as "beyond the call
of duty." See JAMES S. F1sHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982).
62. Jean Hampton, Selflessness and the Loss of Self, in ALTRUISM 135, 164 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 1993); see also id. at 144-45; cf. Peninsular & Oriental, Etc. v. Overseas Oil
Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 836 (2d Cir. 1977) (maintaining that seeking reimbursement of
expenses - as distinguished from a reward - does not make "assistance to an ailing seaman
a matter of negotiation, rather than moral duty. On the contrary . . . this rule will encourage
seamen aboard large vessels to perform their moral obligation to their brethren on smaller
ships without fear their benevolence will result in unreasonable expenses to their ship's
owners.").
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ter."63 Beneficial consequences can be achieved with or without ex
cellence of character and with or without contributing to such
excellence.64 When an action leading to such consequences is "self
initiated and proactive" - a result of an "uncoerced voluntary
choice" - it is indeed virtuous, that is, genuinely altruistic. But
when it is instead "instrumental" and "reactive" - compelled or
otherwise driven by certain external incentives - no virtue and,
therefore, no altruism is involved.65 No action, however appropri
ate, insightful, or beneficial, can qualify as altruistic (virtuous) if not
freely chosen.66 Even worse, expanding the category of beneficial
actions that are not truly virtuous in fact undermines altruism, since
it makes this virtue increasingly unnecessary and, thus, unimpor
tant, relegating altruism to "the dustbin of supererogatory."67
Therefore, institutionalizing altruism - if not an oxymoron - is at
least an undesirable phenomenon, because it "could only reduce
the moral worth of human action."68 In order to sustain its status as
a virtue, altruism needs to be - as prescribed by the

Glenn court -

a reward in and of itself, and the best course of action for a legal
system interested in inculcating altruism is simple inaction.
This is a broad and ambitious argument. It is not satisfied with
merely casting doubt on the value of imposing criminal or civil
sanctions for noninterference to allay another's distress. Rather, it
goes beyond that, implying that even if the behavioral effect of a
restitutionary doctrine favorable to good samaritans is not as dra
matic as that of a doctrine that imposes positive obligations to as
sist, the former doctrine is still bad enough.

Notwithstanding

certain quantitative distinctions, any form of legal intervention whether discouraging noninterference, rewarding successful inter
ventions, or offsetting the pre-legal incentives facing potential good
samaritans - can be interpreted as a device for promoting compli
ance with some public (external) policy;69 thus, any such interven
tion has devastating implications for the virtue of altruism.
63. Douglas J. Den Uyl, The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity, in ALTRUISM,
supra note 62, at 192, 197, 205.
64. See id. at 197.
65. See id. at 192, 222-23.
66. See id. at 197.
67. See id. at 193.
68. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL Sron. 151, 200
(1973).
69. Cf. ROGER CoTIERRELL, THE Pouncs OF JurusPRUDENCE 62 (1989); Neil Duxbury,
Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 Mon. L. REv. 421, 433-34 (1990); Antony
M. Honore, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE Goon SAMARITAN AND nm LAW 225, 226
(James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1981).
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But is, indeed, the concept of altruism extraneous to law? Is
there no possibility of promoting altruism - or any other virtue,
for that matter - through law? Is institutionalizing virtues, such as
altruism, necessarily destructive? I believe that such conclusions
are far too extreme and probably misguided.
To understand why, consider the conception of law implied by
these challenges. Law is perceived merely as a set of incentives that
serves as the basis for the prediction of some external reaction, hos
tile or favorable, to deviation from or compliance with its dictates.
This conception echoes the infamous predictive theory of law.70 As
such, it disregards the "internal point of view" applied by most of us
with regard to the law, according to which legal norms are taken as
"guides for the conduct of social life;" bases for claims, demands,
and criticism; and standards for conduct and judgment.71 Further
more, it is now rather commonplace to assume that law - like
other major social practices and institutions - simultaneously re
flects the prevailing belief system of its constituents, as well as
shapes it; that the relationship between people's dispositions and
the values ingrained into their society's institutional design is one of
reciprocity; that our attitudes toward one another and the prescrip
tions of our legal regime are embedded in one holistic web, each
one inculcating and inculcated by the other.72

If the law is, in fact, such an important social institution, shap
ing, to some extent, its constituents' perceptions of themselves (in
other words, if the law cannot avoid affecting popular conscious
ness),73 then it seems plausible that the law, like other primary so
cial institutions, serves - intentionally or inadvertently - to
preserve, sustain, and reinforce a certain equilibrium between the
70. For the classic statement of the predictive theory of law, see OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).

71. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961); JosEPH RAz, The Relevance
of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUBuc DoMAIN: EssAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND
PoLmcs 261, 280-81 (1994).
72. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept ofMan,
in THE lNrERPRETATION OF Cur.TURES: SELECTED EssAYS 33 (1973); ALASDAIR
MAclNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 220 (2d ed. 1984); SANDEL,
supra note 53, at 179; CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MoD
ERN IDENTITY 27 (1989); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1137,
1142, 1168-69 (1991).
73. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective,
in LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN lNrERPRETIVE ANnmoPOLOGY 167, 218-19
(1983); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRmQUE OF ADJUDICATION 63, 227-28 (1997); Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Keams, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship in Everyday
Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 27-32, 51-54 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds.,
1993).
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self-regarding and the other-regarding perspectives of agents in a
relevant legal community.74
Therefore, we should think of legal norms that encourage good
samaritanism as a public expression of our bonds of concern and
solidarity with others - a symbolic political expression of the im
portance that our community attaches to other-regarding actions
and motives.75

Glenn's

challenge notwithstanding, such norms not

only promote beneficial consequences (altruistic action), but also
preserve and inculcate the other-regarding aspect of our selves.
Even if the direct beneficial conduct that has been engendered by
external incentives cannot be deemed altruistic, the public expres
sion of (limited) altruism as the proper standard for conduct and
judgment is bound to be internalized by the agent as well as by her
community and to prompt future self-initiated and proactive - that
is, genuinely altruistic, virtuous - beneficial actions.76
Phrased so broadly, however, this conclusion is problematic.
The difficulties are rooted in the inherent tension - some would
say, contradiction - between two fundamental characteristics of
law:

its normativity and its coerciveness.77 Thus, alongside the

claim that legally-induced other-regarding conduct can help rein
force the other-regarding side of ourselves, there is the undeniable
possibility that the law's coercive interference in people's lives also
might have a counterproductive impact. The law's threat to individ
ual freedom and control might create resentment or psychological
reactance, which, in tum, may cause people to form negative atti
tudes with regard to the source of this threat (the coercive law),
thus undermining the very possibility of such law serving a trans
formative function.78 If institutionalizing altruism were to create
resentment, it might, in the end, impede - rather than enhance the inculcation of altruistic motives.
74. See Mansbridge, supra note 57, at 138; cf. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Relativism, Per
sons, and Practices, in RELATIVISM: lNrERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 418, 424
(Michael Krausz ed., 1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & Pun. A.FF.
3, 8-10 {1991).
75. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 288-92 (1989).
76. See SHELEFF, supra note 54, at 181; Viola C. Brady, Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort
Law: Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 558-59 {1980).
77. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, In Defense of Defiance, 23 PHIL. & Pun. A.FF. 24
{1994).
78. See Brady, supra note 76, at 560; see also Landes and Posner, supra note 12, at 94
(suggesting that some methods for promoting beneficial interventions, "notably imposing
legal liability for [non-interference]," may turn out to be counterproductive, because they
"may reduce the public recognition accorded to the altruistic rescuer and [thus] the number
of altruistically motivated rescues").
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Indeed, in order to perform effectively its value-shaping func
tion, the law must "bargain against the people's [pre-existing] pref
erences."79 Legal norms may be successfully designed to affect
people's values and preferences, but only if the norms are not
overly ambitious, if they acknowledge that both the law and the
prevailing ethos are cultural systems and, as such, usually evolve
only gradually.80 Neither the goals of the legal norm nor the means
it employs should be perceived as unreasonable and, therefore, of
fensive if the norm is to have actual transformative consequences.
It would appear that encouraging good samaritanism by secur
ing restitution of the costs of benevolent interventions is precisely
the moderate legal device needed to inculcate altruism. It is much
less coercive than the more resolute legal norms, which encourage
beneficial interferences by establishing positive duties of assistance
and by imposing criminal or civil sanctions in cases of nonperform
ance. It is a reasonable device for promoting limited altruism, an
attitude toward others that calls for other-regarding action and mo
tives without mandating selflessness or challenging the existence even predominance - of the self-regarding standpoint of agents.
Therefore, allowing restitutionary relief for good samaritans may
mitigate, if not entirely eliminate, any resentment toward the law's
altruistically oriented interference.81 It also avoids tainting the mo
tives of potential benefactors with any possibility of personal (tangi
ble) gain or reward.82

Hence, contrary to the

Glenn

dictum,

restitutionary measures can promote - rather than do violence to
- "the kindest and best effusions of the heart."83

79. Owen M. FISs, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93
1, 54-55 (1979).
80. Cf. RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 225-75 (1986) (developing the analogy be
tween the law and a chain novel).
81. Hence, it is also plausible to assume that the availability of restitutionary relief would
not significantly reduce the public recognition accorded to the altruistic rescuer and, there
fore, would not cause any decrease in the incidence rate of intervention. See Levmore, supra
note 12, at 885-86; Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 44 n.45. On the other hand, it may well be true
that in cases of extreme distress - notably clear danger to a person's life - the more reso
lute and coercive devices of tort and criminal law may lead to superior behavioral conse
quences (as compared to those induced by the mere availability of restitutionary relief).
Furthermore, in such limited cases, it is possible that imposing civil or criminal liability for
noninterference would not be considered excessive legal interference with individual
freedom.
82. For an elaborate discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
83. Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887).
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Three Conceptions of Altruism

Thus far, I have tried to show that restitutionary claims in cases
of good samaritan interventions can be supported by altruism-based
arguments. The remainder of this section continues this characteri
zation of such arguments by comparing them to the first rationale
suggested for our doctrine - personal liberty. At first glance, the
difference between the altruism rationale and the personal liberty
rationale is obvious. The latter rationale focuses on the beneficiary,
insisting that in certain, well-defined circumstances, encouraging in
tervention can correspond to, or even be required by, her claim to
personal liberty. In contrast, the former rationale addresses the
good samaritan, with the intention of inculcating potential benefac
tors with the value of altruism, of reinforcing their - and that of
society at large - other-regarding standpoint of the self.
These different starting points and theoretical justifications
notwithstanding, the two rationales can coincide in terms of the
ramifications of their adoption as the normative guides for the legal
doctrine. Such concurrence would result if the "other," whose in
terests must be taken into consideration under the altruistic ration
ale, were to be defined exclusively in terms of the beneficiary's
autonomous will. In that case, concern for the other - more accu
rately termed "respect" for the other - would require strict adher
ence to the doctrinal recommendations of the personal liberty
rationale.
But this is only one possible, and by no means exclusive, inter
pretation of the altruistic rationale, which can certainly incorporate
other understandings of the vital interests of individuals. Such rival
understandings need not necessarily negate the importance of the
individual's interest in autonomy or personal sovereignty. This fric
tion merely requires acknowledgment of the fact that personal sov
ereignty is not the only interest that has bearing for an individual,
and therefore, respecting another person's preferences (explicit or
hypothetical) does not exhaust the concept of concern for others.
Genuine concern for other people entails - according to this inter
pretation - taking into account the whole spectrum of human in
terests, particularly their well-being;84 and at times (where the
individual's choice really is substantially non-optimizing), this must
84. Another interest, which, in other contexts, may expand the conception of others' in
terests leading to justified paternalism, is "integrity or self-respect." See Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 774-86 {1983).
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dissatisfaction of the beneficiary.85 In other

words, unlike the deferential stance entailed by respect for others, a
sympathetic understanding of (and response to) another's predica
ment as well as her well-being may require that the benefactor
make a paternalistic decision and act in accordance with the benefi
ciary's true interests and contrary to her explicit, implicit, and hypo
thetical preferences.86
Such paternalistic interference with people's preferences for
"reasons referring exclusively to [their] welfare, good, happiness,
needs, interests, or values," although "not recognized as such by
those persons for whom the good is intended," infringes upon their
freedom of choice.87 In certain cases where an individual's prefer
ences are the result of a clear cognitive failure, ignorance, or ex
treme pressure, a paternalistic overriding of her choices is said to be
justified by reference to "what fully rational individuals would ac
cept as [a form] of protection."88 This justification for preventing
persons from exercising their free will, where their preferences are
either explicit or can be easily determined, is a tenuous ("ideal
ized") version of hypothetical consent. Therefore, even if only such
a weak form of legal paternalism is involved, and (as in most cases
of encouraging beneficial intervention in the face of the benefici
ary's objections) no outright prohibition is at issue,89 such paternal
istic

interference

cannot

be

supported

by

(and

is

instead

antagonistic to) the personal liberty rationale as conceptualized in
the previous section. Whereas altruism as respect for others offers
·
an additional normative premise for the doctrine endorsed by the
personal liberty rationale, altruism as a paternalistic concern for
others may lead to a completely different legal doctrine.
85. See Richard J. Arneson, Paternalism, Utility, and Fairness, 43 REv. INTL. DE P.mr.. 409,
435 (1989).
86. See RoBIN WE.Sr, Taking Preferences Seriously, in NARRATIVE, AUTIIORITY, AND
LAW 299, 319-30 (1993); see also Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in

Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 Mo. L. REv. 563, 638-42, 647 (1982). There is some controversy respecting the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of "judicial paternalism" and "legislative pater
nalism." Compare WE.Sr, supra, at 330-39 with David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and
Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 551-58 (1988). A discussion of this institutional question is
beyond the scope of this article.
87. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 20, 23, 27-28 (Rolf Sartorius
ed., 1983).
88. Id. at 29; cf. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 484-87
(1989).
89. For the distinctions between weak and strong versions of legal paternalism and be
tween outright prohibition and making choices more difficult or less attractive, see Joel
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 87, at 3, 8-11, 17.
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Finally, there is one other interpretation of the altruistic ration
ale with doctrinal consequences that diverge from those of the per
sonal liberty rationale, although this divergence is not as significant
as that manifested by the understanding of the altruistic rationale as
paternalistic concern for others. This deviation could result from an
approach that perceives the interest of promoting concern for
others as a social value of intrinsic importance90 and that acknowl
edges law's impact in inculcating this value.91 Hence, this approach
can justify legal devices that encourage beneficial interventions and, therefore, arguably inculcate communal concern - even in
cases where it is not clear that the intervention corresponds with

the beneficiary's will, that is, where it is not possible to support such
intervention by reference to her explicit, implicit, or hypothetical
preferences. To be sure, nonpaternalistic altruism cannot yield a
policy of encouraging interventions where the beneficiary's disap
proval is - explicitly, implicitly, or hypothetically - clear. In bor
derline cases, however, where it is hard to ascertain the preferences
of the expected beneficiary, an approach that is not content with
merely respecting people's preferences but also seeks to inculcate
concern for others would reject the presumption of noninterference
implied by the personal liberty rationale and would adopt, in its
stead, the opposite presumption, according to which the law seeks
to encourage beneficial interventions.92
III.

TOWA RD

A

NEW DOCTRINE OF GOOD

SAMARITAN INTERVENTION
A.

The Normative Framework

By now, I hope that Glenn's spell has been effectively dissi
pated. Neither personal liberty nor altruism, as I attempted to
show in Part II, are necessarily antagonistic to good samaritan
90. The interest of promoting concern for others obviously would be regarded as an in
trinsic social value from a communitarian perspective, which emphasizes the human belong·
ing to constitutive communities and the entailing value of social responsibility. See supra text
accompanying note 53. The intrinsic value of such collective goods can be appreciated also
from a liberal perspective, as long as we acknowledge that leading an autonomous life re
quires a sufficient number of acceptable alternatives and that at least some of the social
conditions that constitute such options are collective goods. See JosEPH RAz, THE MoRAL
ITY OF FREEDOM 198-207 (1986). Inculcating social solidarity and concern can be perceived
as one of these collective goods of intrinsic value.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
92. As the text implies, there are two senses in which this approach is not paternalistic.
Fust, it does not justify interference when it is clearly undesirable to the benefactor. Second,
it is not motivated by a sympathetic overriding of the benefactor's "mistaken" preferences,
but, rather, by a public interest of promoting concern for others. See Feinberg, supra note 89,
at 13; Shapiro, supra note 86, at 547-48.

March 1999]

Good Samaritan

1177

claims for restitution. On the contrary, in certain circumstances,
both can serve as the normative underpinnings of these claims.
Nonetheless, we have seen that neither necessarily acts to substanti
ate the whole range of altruistically motivated interventions. These
rationales yield a broad spectrum of doctrinal alternatives for shap
ing the contours of a new doctrine of good samaritan intervention,
and consequently, they require that a normative choice be made.
At one end of this spectrum lies the personal liberty rationale,
together with the altruistic rationale interpreted as respect for
others. Both rationales - which, for the sake of simplicity, I join
together below under the title of personal liberty - justify restitu
tion by referring to the benefactor's (ex ante) preferences. Conse
quently, under these rationales, restitution should be allowed if, and
only

if, in the

given circumstances, (a) it was impractical to inquire

into the actual preferences of the expected beneficiary, (b) there is
no external indication that she disapproves. of the court-imposed
contract of intervention in consideration of restitution of expenses,
and (c) the intervention was clearly (ex ante) cost-beneficial to her.
At the other end of this spectrum lies, as we have seen, the "al
truism as a concern for other people's genuine interests" rationale.
To the extent that our law would be willing to adopt this rationale
as the normative guide for its restitutionary doctrine, it would re
quire decisionmakers to consider which types of human interests
and human predicaments justify legal overriding of people's prefer
ences, because according to this stance, a potential beneficiary's
veto need not always be respected.
Between the two poles of the spectrum lies a third approach,
which (unlike the first approach) does not perceive respect for
others' preferences as the sole consideration at issue, but (unlike
the second approach) does not endorse any sort of paternalism.
Rather, it adds the consideration of inculcating concern for others
and - in the name of this social value - allows restitution even

if

the interference involved was not as clearly advantageous to the
beneficiary as required under the personal liberty rationale.
The objective of Part III is not to arbitrate between these three
possible rationales. Instead, it seeks to delineate - albeit only par
tially and in rather broad lines - the contours of a restitutionary
doctrine that seriously renounces

Glenn.

More particularly, in what

follows, I examine three doctrinal issues: the significance of the in
tervention's success; the benefactor's claim to remuneration for her
time, effort, and expertise; and her right to compensation for losses
she may have incurred due to her intervention. With regard to all
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Glenn

necessitates

reforming the current approach to good samaritan intervention at
common law (although the position adopted along the spectrum
discussed above may create a corresponding range of diverging
ramifications in terms of the required doctrinal changes).
There is, however, one aspect of the existing doctrine that I
would be content to endorse. Common law traditionally has differ
entiated its response toward beneficial interventions according to
the interest protected.

In particular, claims of good samaritans

whose intervention was aimed at rescuing life were treated some
what more liberally than those of benefactors who preserved only a
proprietary interest of another.93 Although, as indicated above, I
believe that the approach at common law with respect to both types
of intervention needs to be liberalized, I nonetheless appreciate the
normative power of this distinction and, hence, seek to preserve it.
My reason for this springs from the connection between the spec
trum of possible rationales and the nature of the resource in
volved.94 Thus, given the significance of bodily integrity for our
physical well-being as well as the fact that our body is both the
physical embodiment of our selves and the utmost reflection of who
we are,95 it should not be surprising that even the traditional doc
trine allows restitutionary claims for services rendered in rescuing
another's life or health, notwithstanding certain types of objections
(irrational or uninformed) on the part of the beneficiary.96 On the
other hand, where the protected interest is not life or limb, but
merely proprietary in nature, and where there are no specific cir
cumstances indicating some unique characteristic(s) of the potential
beneficiary's predicament, even this weak paternalism seems mis
placed.97 With respect to proprietary interests, the significant nor
mative choice that our law faces seems to be between the pure
personal liberty rationale and the intermediate stance that gives
weight also to the social interest in inculcating altruism.
93. See Muir, supra note 14, at 310.
94. For a related argument respecting another paradigmatic case of the law of restitution,
see DAGAN, supra note 17, at 40-49, 63-108.
95. See Russell W. Belk, The Ineluctable Mysteries of Possessions, in To HAvE PossES·
SIONS: A HANDBOOK ON OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY 17, 19 (Floyd w. Rudmin ed., 1991);
Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER REs. 139, 157 (1988);
Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 41 J. PsYCHOL. 13, 18 (1959); Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1880-81 & n.117 (1987).
96. See REsTATEMENT OF REsTrnmoN § 116 (c), (d) & cmt. b & illus. 2-4 (1937). For a
particularly restrictive view, see MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 248-49.
97. Cf. MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 242.
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With this proposed distinction in mind, let me now tum to the
three doctrinal issues mentioned above, beginning with the ques
tion of the significance of the intervention's success.

B.

The Significance of the Intervention's Success

The prerequisite of the Anglo-American law for allowing good
samaritan restitutionary claims is - except, perhaps, with regard to
an intervention directed at saving life98 - that the claimant's effort
to preserve or protect the defendant's interest meet with actual suc
cess. A fruitless intervention, even if reasonable, so the argument
goes, cannot be said to produce "any net value for the defendant" 99
(that is, any enrichment), and in any case, "a reasonable [person]
could say that [s]he would only have been willing to pay for a result,
not an attempt. " 100 In contrast, under civil law systems, the good
samaritan is not required to demonstrate "ultimate success, " as long
as she can show that she acted with "reasonable diligence." 101

In what follows, I argue that whichever rationale outlined in sec
tion III.A above is applied, the civil law requirement of reasonable
diligence is normatively preferable to the more demanding require
ment of actual success applied at common law. In addition, I dis
cuss the criteria according to which such reasonableness should as per these rationales - be examined.

1.

Against a Requirement of Ex Post Success

The starting point for my discussion is the incentive effect of the
current common law requirement of actual success. Making success
the prerequisite for restitution of expenses incurred in altruistic in98. See Cotnam v. WISdom, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (Ark. 1907); Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2
D.L.R. 787, 791 (Can.); REsrATEMENT OF REsnnmoN § 116 illus. 1 (1937).
99. Wade, supra note 9, at 1186-87.
100. BURRows, supra note 14, at 247 n.2; see also REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN
§ 117(1)(e) & cmt. d (1937). Professor Gareth Jones expresses a dissenting opinion. Based
on an analogy to cases of preservation of life, he believes that fruitless but reasonable at
tempts to preserve property should be recognized as sufficient grounds for restitutionary
claims. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 149-50. For a similar point, see MAsoN & CARTER,
supra note 8, at 238, 240. The discussion that follows can be read as a normative defense for
this conclusion.
101. See SIEG EISELEN & GERRITT PIENAAR, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 280 (1993);
LAVASSEUR, supra note 54, at 93-97; F.H. LAWSON ET AL., AMos AND WALTON'S INTRODUC
TION TO FRENCH LAW 194 (2d ed. 1963); Dawson, (pt. 1), supra note 12, at 823; Paolo Gallo,
Remedies for Unjust Enrichment in the History of Italian Law and in the Cadice Civile, in
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE CoMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY oF THE LAW OF REsnnmoN
275, 279 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 1995); R.D. Leslie, Negotiorum Gestio in Scots Law: The
Claim of the Privileged Gestor, 1983 JUR. REv. 12, 15-16; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 99. For a
similar conclusion reached by Talmudic civil law, see JONATHAN BLAss, JEWISH LAw FOR
lsRAEL: UNJUST ENRICHMENT LAW 118 (1991) (Heb.).
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terventions reduces the expected recovery of potential benefactors
to below their actual expenses. This prerequisite thus amounts to a
disincentive for such interventions. Because potential benefactors
can rarely be certain in advance that their intervention will indeed
succeed, they might be discouraged by such a requirement and,
therefore, unwilling to undertake a costly intervention.102
This behavioral impact undermines each one of the possible
normative rationales underlying our doctrine. It is obviously anti
thetical to the rationale of altruism as paternalistic concern for the
genuine interests of others, as well as to the social value of inculcat
ing concern for others: the merit (virtue) in intervention is rooted
in a benefactor's willingness to incur inconvenience or danger in
responding to another's need and, therefore, is not dependent upon
success.103
Furthermore, the disincentive created by the requirement of
success also conflicts with the rationale of personal liberty because
it is contrary to the potential beneficiary's hypothetical preferences.
To be sure, the beneficiary would appreciate not having to pay for
an unsuccessful intervention. Yet this advantage is bound to be
outweighed (ex ante) by the disadvantage inherent in such an ex
emption: discouraging potential benefactors and, thus, depriving
the potential beneficiary of sources of potential assistance. As we
have seen, under such a regime, any potential benefactor who is not
willing to sacrifice her own resources for the benefit of others
would be deterred from intervening unless confident of success.
Because in most interventions success is not guaranteed, and be
cause most potential benefactors - who, in the paradigmatic case
under consideration, do not have any special social relations with
the beneficiary - cannot be regarded as intending to assist gratui
tously (they are not selfless), a requirement of ex post success frus
trates potentially beneficial interventions. Thus, it works to the
detriment of the potential beneficiary (provided, as will be empha
sized shortly, that the interventions indeed are ex ante
beneficial). 104
102. See Dawson, (pt 2), supra note 12, at 1115; Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 62.
103. See LAVASSEUR, supra note 54, at 96-97; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1115;
Kleinig, supra note 58, at 386.
104. Cf. McCamus, supra note 22, at 311-12. To be sure, I do not deny the possible exist
ence of cases where the other-regarding motives of a particular potential benefactor would
suffice in order to induce intervention, even if the law conditions recovery on success. See
Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 95. But if, as I claim in the text, these cases are the
exceptions to the rule, then the hypothetical preference of any potential beneficiary would be
to opt for the legal norm that is most advantageous to her, i.e., the one that does not require
success.
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Yet some authors still insist that to eliminate the requirement of
success would be undesirable.105 They point to the fact that success
- complete or partial - is also required under maritime law.106
The basis of their normative argument in favor of this requirement
is twofold. First, they claim that

if success were eliminated

as a re

quirement, there would not be enough incentive for benefactors
who have begun to intervene, but have encountered difficulties, to
press on and succeed, and not to stop at halfhearted attempts.101
Second, they insist that - insofar as the disincentive created by the
requirement of success is detrimental from the perspective of po
tential beneficiaries - this flaw can be remedied, as it is in mari
time law, by adjusting the amount of recovery received by
successful benefactors so that ex ante potential benefactors are as
motivated as they would be

if they were to receive only restitution

in all intervention attempts.1os
I believe that both prongs of this counterargument are miscon
ceived. First, while the concern with regard "to halfhearted efforts
may be genuine, it seems to me that focusing on this concern is
counterproductive from the perspective of the potential beneficiary.
At least insofar as one agrees that the success requirement has a
substantial disincentive effect, the advantage of the special treat
ment that this requirement gives to halfhearted attempts seems in
significant given that requiring success has the far more likely
consequence of discouraging potential benefactors from making
any effort whatsoever. In other words, if most potential benefac
tors are deterred from intervening due to the fear of incurring fi
nancial loss, what benefit would potential beneficiaries derive from
the guarantee that they will not be charged for halfhearted
attempts? 109
To be sure, this would not be the case if the second claim made
by proponents of the success prerequisite were valid, because if a
legal regime that requires success can still produce sufficient incen
tives to intervene, the best of both worlds can, indeed, be realized.
But I think that unfortunately, there is an important difference be
tween the paradigmatic case under consideration and the maritime
105. See BURRows, supra note 14, at 247; Levmore, supra note 12, at 894.
106. See MAsoN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 244. For maritime law on this point, see, for
example, A.D.M. Forte, Salvage Operations, Salvage Contracts and Negotiorum. Gestio, 1993
JUR. RE.v. 247, 252-53.
107. See BURRows, supra note 14, at 247; Levmore, supra note 12, at 894.
108. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 894.
109. Cf. Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 62 n.152.
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cases in which this happy result is possible. In the maritime context,
as I indicated above,11° rescuers are, in many cases, professional sal
vors, skilled and equipped to undertake the complicated task of
beneficial intervention at sea, doing so as their primary vocation.
In contrast, the typical benefactor with whom this article is con
cerned is a bystander who responds to another's distress, although
this response distracts her from the ordinary pursuit of her prede
termined objectives. This distinction is crucial for our purposes.
For the maritime salvor, interventions are a matter of business;
therefore, as long as her expected recovery exceeds the cost of her
intervention (as it is under maritime law, which combines substan
tial positive rewards in cases of successful intervention with a rule
of no recovery - not even of expenses - where there is no suc
cess), she will intervene whenever such intervention is expected to
be beneficial and, at the same time, be motivated enough to com
plete her task successfully.111 But whereas for the professional mar
itime salvor, the possibility of extracting a positive reward will
usually offset the risk of incurring uncompensated expenses and
losses in cases of failed attempts, it is difficult to believe that this
possibility would have the same effect on the garden-variety by
stander of our paradigmatic case. The latter's intervention is not
part of an enterprise, which is self-insured against failed transac
tions. Therefore,

if the

law were not to provide her with external

insurance - a guarantee that she would not be materially worse-off
due to her other-regarding intervention - the typical bystander,
who is likely to be risk averse respecting such a contingency, would
abstain from intervening, even
tive recovery.112

if faced with the possibility

of posi

My conclusion, therefore, is that contrary to conventional wis
dom, a reasonable person would

not say that she

"would only have

been willing to pay for a result, not an attempt." Rather, the likely
consequence of requiring success is overdeterrence of bystanders
who are potential benefactors. Therefore, this requirement runs
counter to the potential beneficiary's hypothetical preferences.
110. See supra text accompanying note 20.
111. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 101; Rose, supra note 12, at 176, 198.
112. I therefore find myself in agreement with the traditional reluctance of the common
law doctrine of good samaritan intervention to draw analogies from maritime law. See, e.g.,
Nicholson v. Chapman, 126 Eng. Rep. 536, 538-39 (1793). Whereas according to the tradi
tional approach, the difference between these paradigms is that only in the case of maritime
salvage is a legal incentive to intervene needed, I claim that in both cases, legal encourage
ment is required, but that the type of incentive that has an impact on bystanders is different
from the type of incentive that can affect professional maritime salvors.
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This is the case when proprietary interests are at stake, because
even risk neutral potential beneficiaries object to such over
deterrence. This is even more so the case when an intervention is
aimed at saving life or limb, with regard to which most potential
beneficiaries are risk averse. Success, therefore, should not be a
prerequisite for good samaritan claims. Instead, the concern of
halfhearted attempts must be addressed as part of the inquiry as to
the good samaritan's reasonable diligence, so that her claim will be
rejected only

if the intervention's failure is

a result of her inappro

priate withdrawal.
I will not attempt to deny that where a good samaritan's attempt
has failed, she cannot point to any actual enrichment of the benefi
ciary.113 And although some have, in fact, attempted to reconcep
tualize enrichment so as to include also the advantage of such
attempts,114 to my mind, there is no need to do so. I concede that
the concept of enrichment can be interpreted so as to support either
of the conflicting doctrinal rules with regard to the requirement of
success. This result does not disturb me, because in my opinion,
"unjust enrichment" (in cases of good samaritan interventions as
well as in other cases of restitutionary claims) is but a conclusion in
need of supportive normative arguments.115 Hence, only by di
rectly resorting to the pertinent normative considerations (in our
case, reference to the rationales of personal liberty and of altruism)
should and can doctrinal dilemmas be resolved.

2.

Reasonable Diligence in Good Samaritan Interventions

The conclusion that not one of the rationales canvassed above
can substantiate the requirement of success does not imply that the
ex ante likelihood of success carries no weight. On the contrary, as
I implied above, a legal regime guided by the personal liberty ra
tionale must follow the civil law approach and be attentive to the
question of whether the benefactor acted with "reasonable dili
gence" or, more precisely, whether the act performed was to the
advantage of the beneficiary from her perspective at the point in
113. See Wonnell, supra note 23, at 169-70.
114. See Peter Birks, Six Questions in Search ofa Subject - Unjust Enrichment in a Crisis
ofIdentity, 1985 JUR. REv. 227, 250; Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv.
1191, 1201-02 n.27 (1995).
115. See Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in
Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 1999). For a narrower
claim that insists that cases of good samaritan intervention are different from other paradig
matic cases of unjust enrichment and, therefore, are not necessarily concerned with the en
richment of the beneficiary, see Muir, supra note 14, at 297-98; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 41.
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time when the act was performed.116 In other words, potential ben
eficiaries cannot be impervious to the range of different probabili
ties of success, and they (or, rather, their hypothetical preferences)
are bound to be more reluctant to allow interventions as the
probability of success decreases.117 The (ex ante) appeal of inter
vention is conditional upon the magnitude of the expected damage
in the event that no intervention occurs and upon the expected cost
of intervention.11s
This observation can be formulated with greater precision.
Consider the case of a potential beneficiary who is risk neutral with
respect to the exigency triggering the intervention, so that her pref
erences between contingencies are determined according to ex
pected monetary values. This potential beneficiary would prefer
intervention if, and only if, the expected value of the benefit it may
generate (Eb) exceeds its cost (C) . 119 The expected benefit of inter

vention (Eb) equals the magnitude of the expected damage (D)
multiplied by the (ex ante) probability of success,120 that is, the ex

tent to which the intervention seems, at the relevant point in time,
to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the damage (Ps). 121
Therefore, instead of focusing on the requirement of success, courts

13

116. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modem Civil Law,
CoRNELL L.Q. 190, 196 (1928); Rose, supra note 12, at 193.

117. Can the co=on law requirement of success be interpreted as a proxy for desirable
ex ante interventions that (as a proxy) avoids the possibility of judicial error, which might be
involved in the assessment of ex ante desirability? See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitu·
tion for Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1411, 1430, 1437, 1442 (1994). I believe that the
answer to this question is no, for the same reason that the consideration of halfhearted at
tempts is not determinative (see supra text accompanying notes 109-12): the disincentive
effect of the requirement of success makes any advantage it may have in screening interven
tions relatively negligible.
118.
(Heb.);

See DANIEL FRIEDMANN, THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 90,
cf. BLASS, supra note 101, at 119.

104 (2d ed. 1982)

119. Notice that the discussion of the text deals only with securing that inefficient at
tempts are not made. Potential beneficiaries may also be interested in making sure that
benefactors will invest optimal amounts in their attempts: namely, that they will not invest
less than the sum that equates the marginal benefit from rescue with the marginal cost. Such
an optimal result is probably much more difficult for the law to secure unless it allows bene
factors to receive positive rewards, which I believe it should not (see infra text accompanying
notes 155-59). Hence, the text should not be read as suggesting that the doctrine which
compensates for failed but ex ante reasonable attempts optimizes the benefactor's invest
ment from a social welfare point of view. My claim is more modest: that if indeed we are
unwillin g to allow positive rewards, such a doctrine is preferable to the prevailing require
ment of success.
120. For the sake of simplicity, this equation assumes that success means full preservation
of the resource (complete avoidance of D). A more formal presentation requires considera
tion of partial success as well.
121. Formally, P, is the difference between the probability of such damage occurring
when no intervention takes place and the probability of its occurrence given such
intervention.
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that are guided by the personal liberty rationale should ask them
selves whether indeed Eb - which equals D x Ps - exceeds C or, in
other words, whether Ps exceeds CID. If, but only if, the answer to
this question is affirmative, restitution should be granted.122
However, the assumption of risk neutrality is not necessarily ac
curate. At least with respect to contingencies that affect significant
portions of their wealth, people tend to be risk averse - to care not
only about the expected monetary values of these contingencies,

but also about the uncertainty regarding the size of loss per se. 123
Risk averse people are, therefore, willing to pay (for example,
purchase insurance or incur a certain, but rather minimal, loss) in
order to avoid having to face uncertain outcomes.124 More pre
cisely, people's value function seems to be concave for gains and
convex for losses and steeper for losses than for gains, so that their
response to losses is more extreme than to gains.125
The implications of such an attitude to risk in the typical cases
of good samaritan intervention is rather straightforward. Where
the magnitude of the expected damage in the event that no inter
vention occurs is significant and where the expected cost of such an
intervention is relatively small, a risk averse potential beneficiary
would prefer intervention to noninterference, even if Ps does not
exceed

CID.

In other words, such a beneficiary is likely to perceive

intervention as a form of insurance and be willing to reduce the risk
that her resource will be damaged or destroyed by paying some pre
mium - the expenditure of

C

(the cost of intervention) - even

if

the (expected) benefit from the intervention is less than its (certain)
cost. The more a beneficiary is risk averse, the more she is likely to
prefer intervention, even where the expected monetary value is
negative.
Characterizing the attitude to risk of potential beneficiaries as a
group is complicated. Even

if we disregard idiosyncrasies which, in

122. I do not consider the possibility of the intervention causing damage either to the
beneficiary or to a third party. This contingency requires some fine-tuning of my argument,
which is not necessary for the purposes of this article.
123. See STEVEN SHAVELL, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186 {1987). Risk
aversion derives from the fact that people making decisions under uncertainty do not attempt
to maximize expected monetary values, but rather, to maximize expected utility. See ROB
ERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 44-45 {2d ed. 1997). Insofar as the
truism of diminishing marginal utility of income is valid, it generates risk aversion and makes
the degree thereof dependent on the concavity of the graph of utility of wealth. See
SHAVELL, supra, at 186-88.
124. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 123, at 48-49.
125. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing ofDeci
sions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CoNTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67,
74-76 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987).

·
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any event, the law cann'ot adequately address, the extent to which a
potential beneficiary is risk averse is a function of the ratio between
the value of the protected interest at stake and the total wealth of
the beneficiary.126 This implies that most people are probably risk
averse with respect to their lives and bodily integrity. Hence, this
risk aversion allows the conclusion that with regard to this resource,
the personal liberty rationale supports a considerable (although not
total) relaxation of the requirement of ex ante reasonable diligence,
as conceptualized above (obviously, the other rationales, if applied,
would only serve to fortify this conclusion). A more subtle question
arises with respect to proprietary interests . Due to the diversity of
such protected interests and the diversity of potential beneficiaries,
the doctrinal conclusion with regard to proprietary interests must
rely on the pertinent presumption generated by the chosen ration
ale: if our law were to adopt the "pure" personal liberty rationale,
with its presumption of noninterference, it would probably opt for
the more rigid requirement yielded by the assumption that the po
tential beneficiary is risk neutral. In contrast,

if the

intermediate

stance - which gives some weight also to the social value of incul
cating altruism - were to be adopted, the opposite presumption
would govern, and therefore, the more lax interpretation of the rea
sonable diligence requirement would be applicable.121
C.

The Benefactor's Claim for Remuneration

The second doctrinal issue I wish to consider relates to good
samaritan claims for remuneration for time, effort, and expertise.
Common law allows such recovery only with respect to preserva
tion of life or limb and only

if the services rendered were provided

by trained professionals whose unsolicited services fall squarely
within the realm of their vocations (the most typical case is the off
duty physician who provides assistance in an emergency situa

tion).128 Civil law - which originally disallowed any remuneration
126. See SHAVELL, supra note 123, at 189; see also supra note 123.
127. It should be recalled that as far as proprietary resources are concerned, I have dis
counted the possibility of any paternalism being involved.
128. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907); Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2
D.L.R. 787 (Can.); JoNES, supra note 16, at 163; KLlPPERT, supra note 22, at 110-11. But cf.
REsrATEMENT OF REsrmmo N § 117 cmt. c (1937) (including the reasonable value of the
services rendered within the applicable measure of recovery). The traditional common law
dismissal of non-professionals' claims for remuneration is premised on the presumption of
gratuity respecting such benefactors. See REsrATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 cmt. c
(1937); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTITUTION § 3 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1 1983).
This presumption, however, has been vigorously attacked, and many have urged for its rever
sal. See, e.g., JoNES, supra note 16, at 147; Albert, supra note 20, at 97-98, 101-07.
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for services and limited recovery to only the sum of the outlay currently seems to concur with the common law regarding the latter
limitation, but not the former one, so that professional services ren
dered in an ex ante beneficial intervention for the preservation of
another's proprietary interest also trigger a valid claim for ·recov
ery.129 Finally, although it seems common knowledge that the law
prescribes the "reasonable" or fair market value of the services ren
dered as the applicable measure of recovery in cases where a good
samaritan's claim does hold,130 there is some disagreement with re
spect to the valuation of such reasonable value.131 In the leading
case of

Cotnam v. Wisdom, 132 the court held that it should not con

sider prevailing practices (in this particular case, the custom of phy
sicians to graduate their charges according to the patient's ability to
pay) that may indicate what the benefactor's colleagues would have
charged for the service rendered.133 This view, however, is contro
versial, and opposing it is the claim that any practice that affects the
reasonable market value of the services rendered should be taken
into account.134
The claim put forth in this section is that no defense can be
made on behalf of either one of common law's two traditional limi
tations described above. This section maintains that both the altru
istic rationale and the personal liberty rationale prohibit the courts
from limiting renumeration awards to only those claims that meet a
rigid prerequisite with regard to the type of resource preserved.
Furthermore, I contend that although cases of nonprofessional in
tervention may require some special caution, there is no justifica-

129. See LAVASSEUR, supra note 54, at 80-84; LAWSON ET AL., supra note 101, at 194;
WILLIAM J. STEWART, THE LAW OF REsrrnmoN IN ScoTLAND: BEING MAINLY A STUDY OF
THE PERSONAL OBLIGATION TO REDRESS UNJUST ENRICHMENT 168 (1992); Dawson, (pt. 2),
supra note 12, at 1083, 1118-19; D.C. Fokkema & A.S. Hartkamp, Law of Obligations, in
INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS 93, 108 (J.M.J. Chorus et al. eds., 2d
rev. ed. 1993); Leslie, supra note 101, at 21-22; Lorenzen, supra note 116, at 209; Martin,
supra note 54, at 198. Dawson reports that European courts have awarded recovery only to
"members of the learned professions," i.e., "physicians and attorneys." But as he justifiably
insists, "the reasons applicable to [these rescuers] would justify the enlargement of the class
of 'professionals' . . . . In life-rescue cases, as in property salvage, there seems to be no
compelling reason why persons who use marketable skills developed for use in their own
occupations should not recover the market value of the time employed. Recovery could then
be allowed not only by physicians but by nurses or even by mountain guides." Dawson, (pt.
2), supra note 12, at 1085, 1123. As I explain in the text below, my recommendation is for a
further expansion of the range of potential benefactors.
130. See REsTATEMENT OF REsrrnmoN §§ 116 cmt. a, 113 cmt. g, 117 cmt. c (1937).
131. See PALMER, supra note 8, § 10.4.
132. 104 s.w. 164 (Ark. 1907).
133. Cotnam, 104 S.W. at 166-67.
134. See Mcinnes, supra note 12, at 67 n.178.
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tion, from either the perspective of personal liberty or altruism, for
negating all good samaritan claims for remuneration for time and
effort, even if outside the realm of the benefactor's professional ex
pertise. Finally, this section concludes by addressing the question
of the appropriate methods to measure recovery and suggest some
criteria that can help resolve the current doctrinal disarray.
1.

The Overly Restrictive Doctrine

In order to facilitate the discussion of these issues, we should
recall the distinction between explicit, or accounting, cost and op
portunity cost. Accounting cost is the expenditure or out-of-pocket
costs incurred consequent to a certain course of action.135 Often
the cost of our choices - respecting investment, consumption, or
any other matter that requires allocation of scarce resources be
tween competing ends - greatly exceeds the accounting cost. The
true economic cost that an individual incurs in making a decision is
the cost of the next best alternative that must be foregone in order
to take one action rather than another.136 This cost (what has been
relinquished by the agent in order to pursue her chosen course of
action) is the true economic cost -. the opportunity cost - of that
course of action.137
It is clear that acknowledging this fact entails repudiating the
traditional civil law dichotomous treatment of expenditures and
services. Allowing a benefactor reimbursement only for explicit
costs she has incurred cannot be justified because, in the event that
the intervention requires a "loss of profitable time," excluding re
muneration for the benefactor's services leaves intact some of the
intervention's cost.138 Neither the rationale of personal liberty nor
that of altruism justifies such a disincentive.
Thus, provided that the intervention is ex ante beneficial, a po
tential beneficiary (hypothetically) would prefer that possible bene
factors be assured that their reasonable costs - either in the form
of accounting costs or in terms of opportunity costs - will be cov
ered, so that they are not discouraged from rendering assistance.
(From the perspective of the beneficiary, it is immaterial whether
135. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 123, at 28.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Cf. Honore, supra note 69, at 237-38.
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the benefactor subcontracts all of the tasks involved and submits
them as expenses139 or whether she intervenes by herself .)14o
Referring to the rationale of altruism does not alter this conclu
sion. As long as the applicable measure of recovery does not in
clude any component of gain, which could tempt people "to make a
profit out of what should be a kindness,"141 there is no difficulty from the vantage point of the limited altruism toward which our
proposed restitution doctrine may be directed - with compensat
ing benefactors for the true (that is, full) costs of their interven
tions. As I insisted above,142 serving the interests of others when no
self-interest is furthered in so doing is virtuous enough.
One conclusion that can be derived from these remarks is that
there should be no difference in principle between claims for reim
bursement of expenditures spent and claims for remuneration for
services rendered. Furthermore, the above discussion should also
provide sufficient support for the claim that the common law limita
tion of allowing recovery only in cases where life and limb are at
risk is misguided.
To be sure, insofar as the underlying rationale applicable to the

protection of life and limb incorporates a paternalistic component
(which I assume to be absent in cases of proprietary interests), it
may be that the public interest in promoting intervention would jus
tify even stronger means of encouragement - such as positive re
wards - in order to ensure that rescues do, indeed, take place.143
(If this were to be the case, one could also expect some preferential
treatment with regard to claims of professional salvors in order to
encourage their presence and secure their willingness.)144 Nonethe
less, this does not imply that where proprietary interests are at
stake, there is no justification for any encouragement . On the con
trary, as I have just explained, both the altruistic rationale and the
personal liberty rationale require that all types of costs that a bene
factor invests in her intervention should be covered as long as they
are ex ante justified (in the sense discussed in the previous section).
Hence, regardless of whether proprietary interests are governed by
139. See REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN §§ 116 cmt. a, 113 cmt. h (1937) (entitling the
benefactor to do so).
140. See STEWART, supra note 129, at 168; Rose, supra note 12, at 202.
141. Leslie, supra note 101, at 22.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
143. But cf. JoNES, supra note 16, at 163 ("In my opinion it would not be desirable to
reward the stranger who intervenes on land to save human life. This would be to impose a
heavy financial burden on the assisted person.").
144. This indeed, is the case in maritime law. See BURROWS, supra note 14, at 237.
,
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the pure personal liberty rationale or by an intermediate rationale
that gives some weight to inculcating altruism, the conclusion re
mains the same. Namely, with regard to recovery for good samari
tans who act to preserve proprietary interests, there should be no
distinction between claims for out-of-pocket costs and claims for
the opportunity cost of time, effort, and expertise invested, whereby
the former is allowed and the latter disallowed.145
I believe that similar considerations act to cast doubt on the
conventional rule - in both common law and civil law - that lim
its the right to remuneration to professionals. I do not challenge
the truism that in certain circumstances, intervention by non
professionals should be discouraged. Indeed, where a more quali
fied person is available, ready, and able to act, the law justifiably
disallows any claim for restitution.146 This requirement - that the
benefactor be the most "proper" or "suitable" person to act - is
compatible with, even dictated by, all possible rationales: it is obvi
ous that the services of the most competent person available are
preferable above all, because her services are likely to yield the
most effective result. But the conventional limitation under consid
eration rajses a different, separate question. What

if

no profes

sional is present and an available nonprofessional (a passerby
lawyer who stumbles upon an emergency situation, for example) is
competent enough to undertake the task at hand? Her intervention
in such circumstances may, in fact, be desirable (as long as it is ex
ante cost-beneficial). Leaving some of her true costs uncovered,
however - disallowing any recovery for the value of her time, her
opportunity cost - would result in an inappropriate disincentive,
which cannot be justified by any one of the possible normative
premises of the law of good samaritan intervention. In short, pref
erence for professionals is appropriate and fully guaranteed by the
requirement that the benefactor be the most competent person to
act; yet no further discouragement of intervention by nonprofes
sionals is warranted, and therefore, there is no justification for a
blanket dismissal of the claims of such good samaritans for remu145. The text may be an overstatement if potential benefactors - due to, for example,
some cognitive failure - underrate the value of time, effort, or expertise, as compared to
out-of-pocket expenditures. But even if such a phenomenon is prevalent, it seems to me to
have only marginal effects, which may justify some tightening of the requirements for claims
for remuneration of opportunity costs, as opposed to claims for reimbursement of accounting
costs, but cannot vindicate the bright-line distinction discussed in the text.
146. See REsTATEMENT OF REsnnmoN §§ 116 cmt. a, 114 cmt. b (1937); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF REsTITUTioN § 3 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1 1983); BuRRows, supra note 14,
at 244; JoNES, supra note 16, at 147-48; Muir, supra note 14, at 313-14.
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neration for the time and effort they expended in performing their
ex ante beneficial intervention.147
Some authors nonetheless justify such a dismissal by emphasiz
ing the prohibitive administrative costs of quantifying the remuner
ation due to nonprofessionals who, unlike professional benefactors,
do not sell equivalent services in the market.148 This point of criti
cism may well undermine the above conclusion if the available mea
sure of recovery is to be the reasonable market value of the services
rendered. But as claimed in the remainder of this section, I think
that this is not the appropriate measure of recovery for the time,
effort, and expertise invested in good samaritan interventions. Fur
thermore, the alternative measure of recovery that should, in my
opinion, prevail - namely, the opportunity cost of the benefactor's
decision to intervene - is not particularly difficult to administer
when nonprofessionals are involved.

2.

The Measure of Recovery

Awarding good samaritans the fair market value of their serv
ices seems a reasonable mechanism - although, by no means, the
only possible option149

-

if we focus on evaluating the enrichment

of beneficiaries.150 But as indicated above,151 I do not believe that
the concept of enrichment is particularly enlightening for resolving
doctrinal difficulties.

Rather, the pertinent rationales - in our

case, the values of personal liberty and of altruism - should serve
as the springboard for resolving these issues.

It is my hope that I have already satisfactorily established that
- at least with respect to proprietary interests152 - both these ra
tionales point to the same alternative measure of recovery: a mea
sure that reflects the intervention's cost to the benefactor, rather
than its benefit to the beneficiary.153 Only this measure, the bene-

147. For a similar conclusion with respect to maritime law, see Rose, supra note 12, at
191.
148. See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 109-10; Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 67.
149. For the multiplicity of measures of recovery that are used in the law of restitution
under the heading of the beneficiary's gain, see DAGAN, supra note 17, at 12-22.
150. See Wade, supra note 9, at 1186-87.
151. See supra text accompanying note 115.
152. I have already discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 143-44, cases of
rescue of life in which larger measures of recovery may be required.
153. Cf. MAs oN & CARTER, supra note 8, at 244. Interestingly enough, South African
law seems to apply such a measure of recovery. See D.J. JoUBERT & D.H. VAN ZYL, Man
date and Negotiorum Gestio, in 17 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA <J[ 30, at 30-31 (W.A. Joubert
& TJ. Scott eds., 1983); J.P. Van Nikerk, Salvage and Negotiorum Gestio: Explanatory Re
flections on the Jurisprudential Foundation and Classification of the South African Law of
Salvage, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 148, 173 (T.W. Bennett et al. eds., 1992).
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factor's opportunity cost (which is actually, in many cases, easily
determinable),1s4 secures both elimination of any disincentive for
ex ante beneficial interventions as well as guarantees that the bene
factor will not extract from her intervention any positive reward.
The latter concern needs to be reemphasized. Positive rewards
are undesirable from the perspectives of both personal liberty and
altruism.155 The possibility of extracting a positive reward out of an
intervention may become a significant consideration for potential
benefactors, which would be unfortunate.156 Contrary to the dic
tates of the personal liberty rationale, this consideration may en
courage interventions in cases where the cost of intervention
exceeds the expected benefit. Although such interventions involve
the risk of dismissal of the benefactor's claim, the possibility of a
positive reward may, nonetheless, encourage some to take their
chances. Furthermore, the likelihood of positive rewards is perni
cious to the virtue of altruism. Even if, as I insist, altruism does not
necessarily require material self-sacrifice, encouraging interventions
that may be motivated by pure self-interest and, moreover, that
may be (ex ante) counterproductive to the beneficiary's interests, in
no way promotes or inculcates the virtue of altruism.
But why shouldn't we allow benefactors to receive positive re
wards as long as their recovery is limited to the expected benefit of
the intervention to its beneficiary? The concern of the personal lib
erty rationale regarding benefactor's overinvestment seems to be
well protected if this condition is satisfied. Moreover, on face, the
altruistic rationale is also not really undermined by such a rule, be
cause the prospect of payment may cause individualists to rescue,
but will neither decrease the number of rescues by altruists nor de
crease the amount of altruism in the world.
I think that this counterargument is not persuasive. Consider
first the personal liberty rationale, and recall that the contract pre
scribed by law according to this rationale is hypothetical only from
the perspective of the beneficiary (the benefactor confers the bene
fit voluntarily). Hence, a "price" closer to the benefactor's cost 154. In my previous example of a passerby lawyer who stumbles upon an emergency
situation, the opportunity cost is usually determined according to the lawyer's hourly charge.
155. This, of course, is true so long as we are not concerned with paternalistic altruism,
which is, in any case, inapplicable to proprietary interests.
156. Another difficulty, which is sometimes mentioned with respect to positive rewards, is
the concern that overly generous awards would create a moral ·hazard, i.e., that potential
"benefactors" will create a demand (a risk or danger) for their own services. See Levmore,
supra note 12, at 886-87. But the possibility of a deliberate creation of an emergency can be
handled in other, more straightforward, ways, such as by forfeiture of the award and imposi
tion of certain (civil or criminal) sanctions. See Rose, supra note 12, at 194.
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a measure of recovery that leaves a greater share of the hypotheti
cal contract surplus in the hands of the beneficiary - must be pref
erable if we are really concerned with preserving personal liberty.
Moreover, the alternative measure of recovery, which is based on
the beneficiary's expected benefit, can easily be misapplied by the
courts, and if such judicial errors take the form of overestimation,
they will infringe upon beneficiaries' personal liberty.151
More important still is the inadequacy of this proposed regime
from the viewpoint of the altruistic rationale. The whole point of
this rationale, as it is presented herein, is to affect the attitudes of ex
ante individualists, rather then to change the attitude or the behav
ior of ex ante altruists. A regime of positive rewards seems to lose
the expressive or symbolic ramification of a genuinely altruistic
doctrine, and is thus unable to transform ex ante individualists into
other-regarding people. To be sure, I am not contending here that
any kind of payment taints the moral implications of the paid-for
action (in fact, I have argued earlier against this very proposi
tion158). Nor do I think that there is a natural or conceptually nec
essary limitation to the amount of utility that the actor can obtain
and still preserve the moral significance of her act. All I assert is
that

unlike

the

right to

reimbursement

of

costs

(or

their

equivalent), a legal right to a positive reward, in this context at
least, is likely to be perceived as a commercialization of the entire
activity - the doing of it (of every aspect of it) for money - which
is, in turn, likely to dilute the moral significance of beneficial
interventions.159
Hence my claim is that the opportunity cost of an intervention is
the only remedy that responds to the normative premises underly
ing the law of good samaritan intervention. It is, of course, the only
available remedy where nonprofessional benefactors are con
cerned, but it is no less appropriate in cases involving professional
benefactors. To be sure, the fair market value of the services ren
dered frequently could serve as a reasonable proxy for the profes157. See Long, supra note 12, at 431-32.
158. See supra section II.C.2.
159. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). In other
contexts, it may well be the case that some positive payoffs can coexist with an appreciation
of the intrinsic virtue of the action. This is usually achieved by dissociating the action from
the payoff, thus preserving an ambivalent understanding of commodified (paid for or other
wise profitable) and noncommodified (altruistically given) action. See id. at 102-14. Because
I can think of no way to achieve such dissociation if there is a legal entitlement to a reward in
cases of good samaritan interventions, reimbursement of costs (or tµe equivalent thereof)
seems to be the maximum measure that can be awarded without obliterating the potential
shaping effect of our doctrine.
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circumstances, however, where the professional benefactor's oppor
tunity cost would be less than the customary fee (where the demand
for her services is less than the regular demand for such services) or
greater than the customary fee (due presumably to the high level of
her expertise). As I indicated at the outset of this section, the law is
baffling with regard to cases of divergence between the benefactor's
fee schedule and the prevailing fee for such services. My analysis
suggests that the former alternative - that has been hinted at in
the case law, but frequently criticized in the literature - is the nor
matively superior choice.160
D.

The Benefactor's Claim to Compensation for Losses

Lastly, I turn to the question of whether a good samaritan
should be entitled to compensation for damages to her property or
her body that she suffered as a result of her (ex ante) beneficial
intervention. As with the two doctrinal issues considered above,
common law takes a reluctant

(if

not hostile) stance: except in

cases where some negligence on the part of the beneficiary was the
cause of the emergency that "invited" the intervention, common
law consistently refuses to require her1 61 to compensate her bene
factor for any damages caused to the latter (or to her property) due
to the intervention. This rule applies regarding interventions aimed
at protecting a beneficiary's proprietary interests as well as with re
gard to interventions for the preservation of her life or health. 162
The traditional rule has come under criticism from scholars who
have denounced the significance of the beneficiary's negligence163
and have decried the extreme libertarian ("mind your own busi
ness") premise underlying this legal doctrine, which does not re
quire, under any circumstances, that a beneficiary compensate her
benefactor for her losses.164 At times, reference has been made to
civil law (especially in Germany and France), which takes a much
160. See .ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN & RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF CON·
TRACT LAw 61 {1979). The conclusion respecting opportunity costs that are significantly
higher than the customary fee of "regular" professionals should be somewhat modified: in
such cases, the benefactor's recovery should also be conditioned on the unavailability of such
"regular" professionals.
161. Indeed, this section does not address possible proceedings the benefactor may
launch against the person responsible {if any) for creating the emergency. Moreover, I as·
sume that both the benefactor and the beneficiary are uninsured.
162. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 154-55, 164-67; Levmore, supra note 12, at 898; Muir,
supra note 14, at 323 . .
163. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 898-99.
164. See Honore, supra note 69, at 236.
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more liberal approach and manipulates the possible causes of ac
tion in order to indemnify, at least in cases of ex ante beneficial
intervention aimed at life preservation, the rescuer (or her depen
dents) for such losses.165 But this approach has also been criticized.
Where the damage caused by the intervention is severe - the ex
treme case obviously being the benefactor's death - the compen
sation involved may be huge, and notwithstanding the moral appeal
of the claim of the benefactor or her dependents, it seems harsh to
lay the entire loss on the shoulders of the imperiled beneficiary who
is at no fault.166
This dilemma is genuine, and without easy solution.

But I
would, nonetheless, recommend the Israeli statutory mechanism .167
As I hope to demonstrate below, this scheme can be interpreted as
responding to the normative foundations of the law of good samari
tan intervention, as analyzed herein. It is, furthermore, responsive
to the criticism leveled at the traditional common law doctrine as
well as to the reluctance toward its civil law counterpart.
Israeli law treats the benefactor's proprietary losses differently
from the way it deals with her bodily injuries.

If "damage is caused

to the property of the benefactor in consequence of [her interven
tion], the Court may order the beneficiary to pay compensation to
the benefactor if it considers it just to do so in the circumstances of
the case."168 This discretionary authority is limited strictly to dam
ages to the benefactor's proprietary interests. A different statutory
framework is applied with respect to bodily injuries sustained by
good samaritans pursuant to intervention. "A person who volunta
rily without remuneration does any act to save the life or property
of another or others" is entitled, in certain conditions, to compensa165. See LAVASSEUR, supra note 54, at 128-29; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1108-12;
Fokkema & Hartkamp, supra note 129, at 108; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 42, 144-46; Andre
Tune, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan, in THE Gooo SAMARITAN AND THE LAW,
supra note 69, at 43, 51-54.
166. See JoNES, supra note 16, at 166; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1114-15; Stoljar,
supra note 54, at 149-51.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
168. Unjust Enrichment Law, § 5(a), 1979, 33 L.S.I. 44-45, (1978-79) (Isr.); see also Legis
lation, Unjust Enrichment Law 1979 (Israel); 1 REsrmmoN L. REv. 213, 214 (1993). Daw
son mentions a somewhat similar arrangement, which has been adopted by the Swiss
judiciary, according to which discretion can be applied in order to scale down the liability of a
rescued person for her rescuer's bodily injury in the event that such liability exceeds her
ability to pay. See Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1116-17. As explained in the text, the
Israeli rule differs both in its range of application (to proprietary interests alone) and in the
factors of which it allows consideration (as will be indicated below, see infra notes 174-78 and
accompanying text).
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tion from public funds, which are administered as part of the social
security apparatus.169
The normative justification for allowing compensation, in cer:.
tain circumstances, for damages sustained to a benefactor's prop
erty in the course of and due to her intervention should be obvious
by now. Disallowing compensation is tantamount to creating a dis
incentive for a possible beneficial intervention,170 contrary to the
hypothetical preferences of the beneficiary.171 Hence, superficially
at least, there should be no distinction whatsoever between claims
for restitution of expenses incurred and claims for compensation for
damages caused.112
I do not wish to dispute this need of the law to offset the disin
centive effects of the risk of benefactors' damages.173 My point is a
more modest one. I merely wish to emphasize the need to draw
certain distinctions between restitution of expenses and compensa
tion for damages and thereby caution against making a hasty anal
ogy between these two issues.
169. The National Security Law (Consolidated Version), § 287(5), 1995, 1522 L.S.I. 210,
(Isr.) [Heb.]; see also Life-Saving Operations {Soldier Casualties) (Benefits) Law, § 2, 1965,
19 L.S.I. 314, {1964-65) (Isr.) ("A soldier who sacrificed his life, or became an invalid, in
rescuing a person from mortal danger shall, in all respects, be regarded as a fallen soldier or a
Defence Army of Israel invalid, as the case may be."). A similar solution was reported to be
applied in Austria and has been strongly recommended by leading authorities. See JoNES,
supra note 16, at 167; Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1121 & n.112; Honore, supra note 69,
at 236-37. For similar, although less comprehensive, schemes in other countries, see John P.
Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, in THE Gooo SAMARITAN AND nm LAW,
supra note 69, at 63, 75-67, 88; Stoljar, supra note 54, at 151-52; Wade, supra note 9, at 1188
n.26.
170.
171.

See Albert, supra note 20, at 108; cf. Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 68.
See Honore, supra note 69, at 236.

172. Moreover, at times, the distinction between expenditures and losses may seem "arbi
trary and uncertain." Mclnnes, supra note 12, at 69; see Albert, supra note 20, at 104 n.105;
cf JoNES, supra note 16, at 164-65 (stating that courts should alert themselves to the possibil
ity of a claim for expenses that conceals a claim for loss suffered).
173. Such an attitude is implied by Landes and Posner. They maintain that there is no
need to permit benefactors to obtain compensation for damages they incur:
(i]f the probability of serious injury to the (benefactor] is slight ex ante, then the ex
pected cost of (her intervention] will not be substantially higher than if there were no
danger, while if the probability of a serious injury to the (benefactor] is high ex ante, the
net expected benefits from the rescue attempt are apt to be small or even negative. In
neither case is there a substantial basis for seeking to alter the level of (altruistically
induced) rescues by always giving the (benefactor] a right to compensation for [her]
injury.
Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 111-12. Although I agree with the latter conclusion, I do
not think it implies - as Landes and Posner suggest - a vindication of the common law
blanket refusal to allow compensation. These authors ignore the intermediate (and, there
fore, probably most frequent) cases in which the expected injury is not slight, so that compen
sation is not superfluous, but is still not too high, and the intervention is, therefore, not (ex
ante) undesirable. The doctrine suggested below seeks to accommodate these cases, as well
as both the extreme categories referred to by Landes and Posner.
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To begin with, if the intervention has been performed by a pro
fessional who sues and recovers remuneration for her services, one
should be aware of cases where the benefactor's fee schedule al
ready incorporates a risk premium, so that no further compensation
is necessary to offset the disincentive effect of the risk of dam
ages.174 But even if no such double compensation is involved, there
is still a need to distinguish between restitution and compensation,
at least with respect to emergency cases involving people's proprie
tary interests.
When I discussed the question of restitution of good samaritan
expenses, I considered the beneficiary's possible risk aversion to the
damage that the intervention was aimed to prevent. This possibility
led me to the conclusion that if the law were to adopt an intermedi
ate stance that confers some weight on the social value of inculcat
ing altruism, it also would need to adopt a lax interpretation of the
reasonable diligence requirement.175 The same reasoning, however,
cannot be applied in this context because, unlike the accounting
and the opportunity costs of intervention, which are relatively fixed
ex ante, the cost of the benefactor's damages cannot be predeter
mined. Therefore, from the potential beneficiary's vantage point,
the contingency of excessive damage to the benefactor is just as
risky as the contingency of the occurrence of the damage that the
intervention is meant to prevent (which relates, I assume now, to
her proprietary interests).176 Consequently, even risk averse bene
ficiaries would opt for a rigid interpretation of the reasonable dili
gence requirement. If indeed - as I assume throughout - there is
no paternalistic overriding of beneficiaries' hypothetical prefer
ences when proprietary interests are at stake, the law should also
adhere to this rigid interpretation.
In short, where proprietary losses to the benefactor are a rea
sonable result of her intervention, compensation for such injuries
should be allowed only

if they

are ex ante cost-beneficial, that is,

only if the expected benefit of an intervention (or, the magnitude of
the expected damage it is aimed to prevent multiplied by its ex ante
probability of success) exceeds its expected cost (which is the sum
of its accounting and opportunity costs and of the expected cost of
174. See Albert, supra note 20, at 118.
175. See supra text accompanying note 127.
176. Tue text assumes that the extent of uncertainty of the two risks involved - losing
the interest that is at peril and being exposed to tortious liability
is similar as well. If this
assumption is relaxed and the beneficiary is risk averse, the comparison of the expected risks,
suggested in the text below, is not sufficient, and due consideration must also be given to the
relationship between their standard deviations.
-
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the damage that may occur to the benefactor's property as a conse
quence of her intervention).
This analysis, however, does not apply with respect to cases
where the intervention is aimed at protecting life or limb and not
proprietary interests. One can hardly deny that the risk aversion of
potential beneficiaries respecting bodily injuries is typically greater
than their risk aversion in the context of monetary losses, even if
significant, as in the case of beneficiaries who may be found liable
for their benefactors' damages.177 Hence, whereas the risk of such
liability is deemed to make even a potential beneficiary who is risk
averse somewhat cautious respecting an ex ante beneficial interfer
ence with her proprietary interests, she can be presumed to take a
much less reluctant stand when her life or limb is at stake. In other
words, her risk aversion regarding bodily injuries outweighs her risk
aversion respecting monetary liabilities, so that the lax, rather than
the rigid, interpretation of the reasonable diligence requirement re
flects her hypothetical preferences. Furthermore, insofar as the law
would apply some version of the paternalistic interpretation of the
altruistic rationale with regard to the individual's interest in her
bodily integrity, , we could find justification for encouraging inter
ventions aimed at protecting these interests, even if an intervention
deviates from the beneficiary's hypothetical preferences.11s
The foregoing discussion justifies the need to reform common
law with regard to compensation of benefactors for proprietary
damages they incur and explains the need to grant the judiciary a
margin of discretion to accommodate the considerations that should
delineate the compensatory liability of the beneficiary. Yet should
the conclusions of this discussion be applicable only to the benefac
tor's proprietary damages? What about her bodily injuries? Do
bodily injuries not entail precisely the same considerations and,
therefore, require precisely the same doctrinal conclusion? How
can we justify a statutory scheme that exempts beneficiaries - con
trary to the most basic maxim of mutual responsibility - from lia
bility for bodily damage to their own benefactors and shifts the cost
to the public pocket?
It seems to me that the need to resort to a public law solution
when a benefactor has suffered bodily injury derives from the fact
that this is the most extreme - and, hence, most troubling - in
stance in which both rules of no recovery (the traditional common
177. See supra text accompanying note 126.
178. As the text implies, however, one can assume that this paternalistic overriding would
still be limited.
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law doctrine) and of (relatively) easy recovery (its civil law counter
part) are unsatisfactory. Leaving such a benefactor to her own de
vices is not an acceptable solution: it undermines altruism, and

usually, it also contradicts the hypothetical preferences of potential
beneficiaries. As critics of the civil law approach frequently com

ment,179 however, compensation for bodily injury is typically high,

and imposing such a prohibitive liability on an innocent beneficiary

- even where the intervention corresponds with her hypothetical
preferences1so - seems just as unacceptable an outcome. The so
cialization of the risks of good samaritan interventions averts both

of these undesirable results. Moreover, the "public subsidy" of al

truistic interventions that lead to bodily injury of benefactors spreading the cost of mutual aid over the whole community in these
extreme circumstances - can be interpreted as (at least a symbolic)
reaffirmation of the public interest in inculcating the virtue of
altruism.1s1

IV.
The spirit of

EPILOGUE

Glenn v. Savage

has dominated the common law

for far too long. It has entailed a hostile attitude toward claims
made by good samaritans. It has led to a distortion of the doctrine
in vital aspects - for example, establishing the undesirable require

ment of success; applying an overly narrow scope of admission of
claims for remuneration for time, effort, and expertise; and insisting
on a blanket refusal of any compensation to benefactors for dam
ages they incur consequent to their intervention.
A careful analysis of the normative justifications of

Savage

Glenn v.

exposes their weaknesses, demonstrating that neither per

sonal liberty nor altruism justify the common law's traditional re
luctance with regard to the monetary claims of good samaritans.
Indeed, we have seen that both values mandate - albeit for differ
ent reasons and in differing degrees - radical reform of the pre
vailing rules.

Such reform can and should be informed by

comparative analysis. Hence, I pointed to the civil law requirement
of reasonable diligence as a better rule than the common law re
quirement of success and to the Israeli complex statutory scheme
regarding benefactor damages as a relatively satisfactory solution to

179. See supra text accompanying note 166 .
180. Obviously, the objection to exacting restitution from the beneficiary is even stronger
when the intervention was not justified in terms of her hypothetical preferences but, rather,
only due to the law's paternalistic stance.
181. See SHELEFF, supra note 54, at 135; cf. Dawson, (pt. 2), supra note 12, at 1121.
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the difficult consequences of both the common law and civil law
doctrines.
In the final analysis, however, arbitrating between doctrinal al
ternatives requires an explicit normative investigation. Only such
an investigation could justify my recommendations for these doctri
nal "borrowings." Only an explicit normative discussion could help
specify the more precise meaning of reasonable diligence and ex
plain why claims for remuneration for time, effort, and expertise
should not be limited strictly to professional benefactors who act to
save life and limb, and why the proper measure of recovery in such
claims should be the benefactor's opportunity cost. Finally, as we
have seen, with regard to some doctrinal issues, the recommenda
tions of the personal liberty rationale and those of the altruistic ra
tionale (more precisely, of some of its interpretations) diverge.
With regard to these issues, there is no choice but to confront our
commitment to personal liberty, the significance we attribute to in
culcating altruism in our society, and our instinctive sense of sympa
thetic concern for the genuine interests of others.

